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Introduction	  
	   March	  Madness	  sweeps	  the	  country	  every	  year,	  with	  over	  eighty	  million	  
enthusiastic	  fans	  gathering	  around	  their	  office,	  school,	  or	  online	  to	  discuss,	  argue,	  
gamble,	  and,	  of	  course,	  watch	  the	  exciting	  sixty-­‐eight-­‐team	  basketball	  tournament.	  
This	  is	  after	  eagerly	  keeping	  up	  with	  games,	  statistics,	  and	  injury	  reports	  of	  the	  
regular	  season	  games,	  which	  fill	  stadiums	  often	  seating	  over	  twenty	  thousand	  eager	  
fans	  even	  before	  the	  exiting	  football	  Bowl	  Championship	  Series	  (BCS)	  has	  come	  to	  
an	  end	  in	  early	  January.	  Americans	  will	  listen	  to	  the	  games	  on	  the	  radio,	  pay	  to	  get	  
access	  to	  them	  online,	  or	  watch	  them	  on	  television	  programs	  exclusively	  dedicated	  
to	  these	  two	  sports.	  This	  is	  in	  addition	  to	  buying	  tickets	  to	  worship	  their	  teams	  
alongside	  107,500	  fans	  in	  stadiums	  such	  as	  the	  newly	  renovated	  $280	  million	  Big	  
House	  in	  Ann	  Arbor.	  Rivalries	  pit	  family	  members	  and	  neighbors	  against	  each	  other,	  
and	  team	  pride	  is	  displayed	  through	  flashy	  merchandise.	  	  
An	  uninformed	  observer	  would	  assume	  that	  these	  leagues	  are	  highly	  popular	  
examples	  of	  professional	  sports	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century.	  They	  could	  not	  be	  more	  
wrong,	  however,	  as	  the	  league	  in	  question	  is	  Division	  IA	  of	  the	  National	  Collegiate	  
Athletic	  Association	  (NCAA).	  The	  Association,	  “the	  voice	  and	  conscience	  of	  college	  
sports”	  (Brand,	  1)	  holds	  the	  task	  of	  governing	  intercollegiate	  athletics,	  ensuring	  that	  
the	  safety	  of	  its	  players	  and	  the	  sanctity	  of	  amateurism	  and	  education	  are	  
maintained	  within	  its	  competition.	  This	  organization	  generated	  a	  modest	  $871	  
million	  in	  revenue	  from	  television	  contracts	  and	  other	  sources	  last	  year,	  while	  its	  
top	  ten	  institutions	  alone	  generated	  over	  $1	  billion	  from	  athletics	  through	  
donations,	  ticket	  sales,	  sponsors,	  and	  various	  other	  endorsers	  (ncaa.org).	  The	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amateurism	  that	  the	  NCAA	  protects	  is	  supposed	  to	  represent	  the	  precedence	  of	  
academic	  success	  over	  athletic	  prowess	  by	  having	  students	  participating	  in	  athletics	  
also	  be	  scholars	  engaged	  in	  a	  non-­‐professional	  extracurricular	  activity.	  It	  seems,	  
however,	  that	  the	  NCAA	  has	  evolved	  into	  a	  professional	  league	  comprised	  of	  teams	  
representing	  their	  universities	  on	  the	  main	  stage	  in	  a	  media-­‐driven,	  hyper-­‐popular	  
phenomenon	  that	  has	  captivated	  the	  American	  public.	  	  
The	  American	  legal	  system	  is	  set	  up	  based	  on	  values	  that	  our	  founders	  and	  
past	  justices	  have	  deemed	  to	  be	  universal	  and	  necessary	  for	  ensuring	  happiness	  to	  
all	  citizens.	  Our	  complex	  network	  of	  legislation	  has	  the	  purpose	  of	  ensuring	  fairness	  
and	  equality	  of	  opportunity,	  in	  addition	  to	  regulating	  part	  of	  the	  structure	  and	  
operation	  of	  the	  economy.	  Although	  operating	  a	  well-­‐established	  laissez	  faire	  
system,	  parameters	  are	  set	  by	  various	  government	  branches	  to	  protect	  the	  market	  
from	  uncompetitive	  practices	  that	  hinder	  market	  permeability	  and	  growth.	  
Politicians	  and	  judges	  often	  preach	  the	  importance	  of	  operating	  under	  common	  
rules	  that	  govern	  all	  of	  our	  actions	  so	  that	  the	  playing	  field	  is	  level.	  In	  this	  painfully	  
ironic	  example,	  sports	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  microcosm	  of	  our	  socio-­‐political	  ideology,	  with	  
players	  working	  together	  to	  achieve	  common	  goals	  and	  competing	  against	  other	  
actors	  with	  some	  individuals	  being	  more	  successful	  than	  others,	  all	  while	  operating	  
under	  common	  rules.	  	  
Unfortunately,	  the	  NCAA	  has	  abused	  its	  unique	  existence	  in	  the	  world	  of	  
academia	  and	  athletics	  and	  manipulated	  our	  constantly	  revised	  system	  to	  meet	  its	  
financial	  goals.	  This	  type	  of	  flagrant	  behavior	  is	  what	  our	  country’s	  system	  prides	  
itself	  on	  avoiding.	  There	  is	  no	  other	  category	  of	  people	  in	  American	  society	  that	  does	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not	  receive	  compensation	  for	  labor	  in	  the	  free-­‐market	  economy	  or	  is	  denied	  
contractual	  negotiation	  rights	  due	  to	  a	  permitted	  monopsony	  that	  prevents	  choice	  
for	  sellers	  of	  a	  desired	  skill.	  	  
It	  is	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  legal	  and	  political	  academics	  to	  revisit	  the	  legislation	  
surrounding	  the	  NCAA,	  given	  the	  changes	  that	  have	  occurred	  in	  the	  last	  two	  
centuries	  to	  the	  legal	  term	  “amateur”	  so	  that	  they	  may	  be	  able	  to	  create	  effective	  
change	  that	  would	  reintegrate	  intercollegiate	  athletics	  into	  the	  greater	  goals	  of	  our	  
economy	  and	  society	  by	  aligning	  them	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  system.	  
Throughout	  its	  history,	  the	  NCAA	  has	  continually	  stripped	  its	  participants	  of	  their	  
rights,	  while	  promoting	  its	  commercial	  popularity	  and	  manipulating	  its	  members	  
into	  following	  a	  corrupt	  system	  that	  hides	  behind	  a	  noble	  concept	  in	  a	  hypocritical	  
manner.	  Continuing	  in	  this	  manner	  will	  only	  lead	  to	  further	  unfair	  exploitation	  
through	  careful	  crafting	  of	  regulations	  that	  hold	  universities	  in	  a	  colonialist	  system,	  
while	  baiting	  their	  leaders	  with	  irresistible	  revenue.	  Although	  reform	  to	  this	  
capitalist	  system	  is	  necessary	  to	  restore	  fairness	  and	  equity	  to	  a	  duplicitous	  system,	  
it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  change	  will	  emerge	  from	  within	  the	  biased	  organization	  or	  its	  
members,	  and	  must	  instead	  come	  from	  federal	  court	  orders.	  Finally,	  an	  appropriate	  
alternative	  exists	  and	  can	  be	  implemented	  in	  a	  fashion	  consistent	  with	  the	  current	  
presentation	  for	  the	  invested	  fans	  and	  without	  interfering	  with	  the	  free-­‐market	  
requirements	  of	  such	  an	  enterprise.	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1.	  A	  History	  of	  Amateurism	  
The	  New	  Oxford	  American	  Dictionary	  defines	  the	  term	  amateur	  as	  “a	  person	  
who	  engages	  in	  pursuit,	  especially	  a	  sport,	  on	  an	  unpaid	  basis.”	  This	  is	  also	  the	  
definition	  that	  most	  viewers	  of	  intercollegiate	  athletics	  use	  when	  they	  spend	  $30	  or	  
more	  on	  a	  ticket	  to	  see	  two	  state	  universities	  match	  up	  in	  a	  regular	  season	  game.	  
Avid	  basketball	  fans	  are	  also	  happy	  to	  pay	  a	  minimum	  of	  $450	  to	  attend	  the	  Final	  
Four,	  the	  last	  three	  matches	  of	  the	  NCAA	  Tournament	  (www.ncaa.org).	  
Nevertheless,	  many	  fans	  will	  insist	  that	  it	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  amateurism	  that	  makes	  
these	  athletic	  outings	  as	  exciting	  as	  they	  are	  (Branch,	  2).	  Most	  fans	  turn	  a	  blind	  eye	  
to	  the	  multi-­‐million	  dollar	  salaries	  of	  top	  coaches,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  monstrous	  cost	  of	  
building	  new	  arenas	  and	  stadiums.	  They	  seem	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  every	  large	  
organization	  around	  the	  sport,	  but	  remain	  unmoved	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  amateurism,	  
aligning	  their	  preconceived	  notions	  of	  the	  value	  of	  concept	  of	  “student-­‐athletes”.	  
In	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  how	  this	  term	  came	  about,	  we	  should	  look	  to	  
the	  history	  of	  intercollegiate	  sports.	  This,	  of	  course,	  begins	  in	  the	  first	  major	  western	  
universities,	  at	  Oxford	  and	  Cambridge	  in	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century.	  
Industrialization	  led	  to	  a	  number	  of	  changes	  in	  social	  dynamics	  during	  this	  period,	  
allowing	  aristocrats	  to	  earn	  larger	  profits	  than	  ever	  before.	  This	  allowed	  more	  free	  
time,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  sports	  at	  large	  and	  the	  increased	  occurrence	  
of	  sports	  in	  boarding	  schools	  and	  even	  universities’	  Elite	  anglophiles	  insisted	  that	  
these	  sports	  not	  become	  the	  focus	  of	  one’s	  education	  (Sack	  and	  Staurowski,	  9-­‐13).	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This	  is	  not	  because	  of	  notions	  we	  hold	  today	  such	  as	  top	  high	  school	  recruits	  
being	  students	  before	  they	  are	  athletes,	  but	  rather	  because	  aristocrats	  were	  not	  
expected	  to	  put	  all	  of	  their	  effort	  in	  any	  one	  direction.	  Ideals	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  
Renaissance	  dictated	  this	  idea	  of	  diversifying	  one’s	  knowledge	  horizontally,	  that	  is,	  
across	  a	  variety	  of	  disciplines,	  rather	  than	  specializing	  vertically	  in	  a	  single	  area	  of	  
study	  (Kaburakis,	  297).	  Highly	  trained	  professionals	  were	  akin	  to	  lower	  class	  
individuals	  such	  as	  butchers	  or	  shoemakers.	  Professional	  athletes	  would	  be	  viewed	  
as	  overdeveloped	  in	  one	  area	  and	  atrophied	  in	  all	  others,	  unfit	  for	  the	  aristocracy	  
that	  the	  University	  was	  breeding.	  The	  key	  to	  the	  relevance	  of	  amateurism	  in	  this	  
period,	  however,	  lies	  in	  spectators:	  “To	  the	  undergraduate,	  sport	  is	  not	  an	  exhibition	  
to	  be	  watched;	  it	  is	  a	  recreation	  to	  be	  indulged	  in	  actively”	  (Savage,	  78).	  Although	  
this	  is	  still	  true	  of	  Division	  III	  programs	  in	  the	  NCAA,	  clearly,	  undergraduate	  athletes	  
today	  are	  no	  longer	  just	  playing	  for	  themselves,	  but	  are	  also	  performing	  for	  huge	  
numbers	  of	  people.	  
As	  professional	  sports	  began	  gaining	  international	  relevance,	  it	  became	  too	  
strenuous	  to	  be	  an	  amateur	  and	  also	  remain	  competitive.	  Athletes	  from	  lower-­‐class	  
backgrounds	  needed	  some	  form	  of	  compensation	  in	  order	  to	  survive.	  Because	  
sports	  governing	  bodies	  were	  comprised	  of	  elites	  who	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  share	  their	  
profits,	  their	  response	  continued	  to	  be	  that	  elite	  athletic	  levels	  could	  be	  attained	  in	  
one’s	  own	  spare	  time	  (Sack	  and	  Staurowski,	  14).	  Thus	  no	  change	  was	  made	  in	  
international	  athletics,	  as	  there	  was	  not	  enough	  money	  coming	  in	  from	  spectators	  to	  
justify	  paying	  these	  athletes	  after	  the	  organizing	  bodies	  got	  their	  share.	  The	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standard	  of	  amateurism	  was	  continued,	  not	  for	  ideological	  reasons	  of	  molding	  a	  
certain	  type	  of,	  but	  because	  of	  monetary	  convenience	  (Duderstadt,	  63).	  	  
As	  universities	  in	  the	  United	  States	  developed	  along	  these	  same	  lines,	  
Harvard	  alumnus	  and	  president	  Charles	  Eliot	  declared	  in	  1858	  while	  reminiscing	  
about	  his	  collegiate	  rowing	  career	  “I’d	  rather	  win	  than	  not,	  but	  it’s	  mighty	  little	  
matter—rowing	  is	  not	  my	  profession…	  It	  is	  only	  recreation,	  fun,	  and	  health”	  (Eliot,	  
80).	  However,	  as	  urban	  migration	  occurred	  between	  1860	  and	  1920,	  it	  became	  
difficult	  to	  continue	  holding	  such	  views.	  As	  the	  population	  was	  shifting	  toward	  
cities,	  mass	  entertainment	  was	  becoming	  a	  necessity,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  
professional	  leagues	  as	  popular	  culture	  shifted	  toward	  spectator	  sports.	  Of	  course,	  
professional	  sports	  in	  the	  post-­‐Civil	  War	  era	  were	  quickly	  expanding	  given	  the	  
nature	  of	  supply	  and	  demand	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  During	  the	  Second	  Industrial	  
Revolution,	  the	  booming	  economy	  led	  to	  much	  interest	  in	  investing	  in	  such	  
promising	  enterprises	  as	  popular	  sports.	  Since	  professional	  sports	  were	  still	  in	  their	  
infancy	  and	  the	  hunger	  for	  profits	  being	  exceptionally	  high,	  it	  was	  natural	  that	  
interest	  in	  expanding	  collegiate	  sports	  would	  be	  equally	  high	  (Sack	  and	  Staurowski,	  
17).	  	  
In	  this	  business-­‐driven	  era,	  it	  was	  the	  wealthy	  industrialists	  that	  controlled	  
the	  universities	  and	  sat	  on	  their	  boards	  of	  trustees,	  having	  replaced	  the	  clergymen	  
that	  had	  previously	  run	  these	  positions.	  Many	  of	  them	  believed	  that	  intelligence	  is	  a	  
preferred	  quality	  over	  intellect	  for	  the	  graduates	  and	  “many	  were	  not	  entirely	  
convinced	  college	  was	  even	  necessary”	  (Sack	  and	  Staurowski,	  20).	  The	  quick	  no-­‐
nonsense	  problem-­‐solving	  techniques	  that	  are	  developed	  by	  playing	  sports	  are	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exactly	  the	  types	  of	  qualities	  that	  the	  business	  class	  preferred	  over	  the	  ideals	  that	  
emerge	  from	  a	  liberal	  arts	  education	  (Branch,	  7).	  A	  shift	  in	  the	  ideology	  behind	  the	  
functionality	  of	  an	  education	  that	  has	  occurred	  since	  the	  early	  days	  of	  British	  
universities	  encouraging	  an	  amateur	  status.	  Instead,	  the	  anti-­‐elitist	  and	  anti-­‐
intellectual	  ideologies	  of	  the	  industrialist	  became	  geared	  toward	  anti-­‐amateurism	  
(Zimbalist,	  192).	  
Furthermore,	  these	  profit-­‐driven	  individuals	  saw	  an	  opportunity	  to	  promote	  
their	  colleges,	  which	  were	  often	  located	  in	  states	  that	  could	  barely	  survive	  in	  their	  
low-­‐population	  Midwest	  and	  West.	  This	  meant	  that	  aggressive	  campaigning	  for	  
students	  was	  to	  begin	  by	  advertising	  their	  paid	  teams	  of	  student-­‐athletes.	  Not	  only	  
would	  this	  bring	  in	  needed	  students,	  it	  would	  also	  allow	  for	  huge	  amounts	  of	  
revenue	  from	  ticket	  sales.	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  employing	  a	  particularly	  aggressive	  
view,	  bred	  its	  football	  team	  for	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  traveling	  around	  the	  country	  and	  
beating	  other	  teams	  to	  prove	  its	  prowess	  as	  an	  institution	  of	  higher	  learning.	  
“Between	  1896	  and	  1909,	  the	  university’s	  enrollment	  increased	  from	  1,815	  to	  5,500	  
students“	  (Sack	  and	  Staurowski,	  32).	  An	  $80,000	  trust	  fund	  had	  been	  set	  up	  for	  
needy	  students,	  but	  instead,	  Amos	  Stagg,	  the	  football	  coach	  at	  the	  time,	  used	  it	  to	  
subsidize	  athletes	  (Duderstadt,	  64).	  This	  was	  happening	  all	  over	  the	  country	  by	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  as	  coaches,	  administrators,	  team	  captains,	  and	  
managers	  were	  campaigning	  actively	  for	  funds	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  players’	  expenses,	  
tuition,	  hotel	  rooms,	  or	  just	  spending	  money	  (Sack	  and	  Staurowski,	  34).	  All	  the	  
while,	  however,	  the	  ideal	  of	  amateurism	  was	  still	  being	  celebrated,	  not	  because	  of	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the	  academic	  goals	  of	  the	  universities	  anymore,	  but	  because	  schools	  could	  gain	  
money	  and	  attention	  from	  a	  self-­‐sustaining	  department.	  
Ivy	  League	  schools	  became	  the	  first	  to	  begin	  outright	  action	  against	  
compensating	  amateurs	  in	  1898	  as	  all	  members	  except	  Yale	  sent	  faculty,	  students,	  
and	  alumni	  to	  Brown	  University	  to	  speak	  about	  the	  issue.	  Their	  Report	  on	  
Intercollegiate	  Sports	  concluded,	  “the	  practice	  of	  assisting	  men	  through	  college	  so	  
that	  they	  may	  strengthen	  their	  athletic	  programs	  is	  insulting	  to	  college	  reputations	  
and	  degrading	  to	  amateur	  sport”(9).	  This	  is	  significant	  not	  only	  because	  these	  major	  
institutions	  of	  higher	  learning	  took	  a	  stand	  against	  a	  practice	  that	  had	  gone	  rampant,	  
but	  because	  the	  idea	  of	  amateurism	  was	  first	  questioned	  here.	  The	  representatives	  
believed	  that	  colleges	  “are	  not	  engaged	  in	  making	  athletes”	  (5),	  much	  like	  the	  British	  
model	  that	  influenced	  this	  ideal.	  In	  a	  sense,	  they	  believed	  that	  capitalism	  should	  not	  
be	  a	  part	  of	  academics,	  and	  neither	  should	  professional	  sports.	  They	  drafted	  a	  
number	  of	  regulations	  that	  they	  hoped	  would	  be	  adopted	  by	  many	  programs.	  They	  
included	  banning	  paid	  athletes	  and	  summer	  participation	  in	  paid	  leagues,	  as	  well	  as	  
eligibility	  restrictions	  that	  would	  be	  voted	  on	  yearly	  (Sack	  and	  Staurowski,	  18-­‐21).	  
This	  report,	  ahead	  of	  its	  time,	  closely	  resembles	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Division	  III	  
athletics.	  No	  schools	  adopted	  the	  full	  regulations,	  and	  only	  a	  few	  adopted	  any	  of	  the	  
restrictions,	  indicating	  that	  amateurism	  did	  not	  matter	  to	  those	  in	  executive	  
positions	  at	  American	  universities.	  Since	  there	  was	  no	  governing	  power	  behind	  the	  
Brown	  Conference’s	  report	  to	  force	  action,	  business	  continued	  as	  usual.	  In	  fact,	  at	  
the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  “many	  athletes	  were	  not	  only	  paid,	  but	  not	  even	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students”(Duderstadt,	  70).	  The	  concept	  of	  amateurism,	  as	  envisioned	  by	  British	  
schools	  and	  early	  American	  colleges,	  was	  already	  long	  dead.	  
In	  1905	  Alexander	  Meiklejohn,	  dean	  of	  Brown	  University,	  spoke	  out	  against	  
the	  “outright	  hiring	  of	  players,”(Sack	  and	  Staurowski,	  24)	  noting	  that	  college	  
athletes	  should	  be	  students,	  not	  professionals	  impersonating	  college	  students.	  Once	  
again,	  no	  one	  listened	  and	  nothing	  was	  done	  for	  the	  ideological	  argument	  for	  
amateurism.	  However,	  when	  concerns	  mounted	  about	  the	  violence	  and	  injuries	  that	  
occurred	  in	  football	  due	  to	  the	  intense	  competitiveness	  that	  comes	  from	  high	  stakes	  
games	  that	  involve	  compensation	  and	  prestige,	  Teddy	  Roosevelt	  responded	  by	  
creating	  the	  Intercollegiate	  Athletic	  Association	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  1906.	  This	  
organization,	  which	  became	  the	  NCAA	  in	  1912,	  aimed	  to	  return	  college	  athletics	  to	  
the	  students	  and	  banned	  recruiting,	  financial	  aid,	  and	  professionals	  (Kaburakis,	  
299).	  Article	  VI	  (b)	  defined	  the	  college	  amateur	  as	  “one	  who	  participates	  in	  sport	  
solely	  for	  the	  physical,	  mental	  or	  social	  benefits	  he	  derives	  therefrom,	  and	  to	  whom	  
the	  sport	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  avocation”(Proceedings	  of	  the	  First	  Annual	  
Convention,	  33).	  The	  key	  flaw	  in	  this,	  however,	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  universities	  were	  in	  
charge	  of	  governing	  their	  own	  actions	  and	  ensuring	  compliance	  with	  NCAA	  
regulation,	  which	  meant,	  as	  one	  would	  expect,	  that	  no	  change	  in	  practice	  occurred,	  
especially	  since	  revenue	  continued	  to	  increase,	  which	  allowed	  money	  to	  be	  
reinvested	  into	  the	  infrastructure	  of	  athletics,	  as	  exemplified	  by	  Yale	  building	  the	  
biggest	  football	  stadium	  in	  the	  country	  in	  1914,	  which	  had	  a	  capacity	  of	  75,000	  fans	  
(Sack	  and	  Saurowski	  33-­‐35).	  The	  ideology	  behind	  amateurism	  was	  once	  again	  a	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farce	  that	  allowed	  universities	  to	  attract	  attention	  though	  hosting	  professional	  
sports.	  
As	  public	  awareness	  of	  these	  practices	  grew,	  so	  did	  media	  interest.	  In	  the	  age	  
of	  famous	  muckraking	  newspapers,	  scandals	  of	  NCAA	  violations	  appeared	  in	  
newspapers	  across	  the	  country	  (Duderstadt,	  56).	  This	  prompted	  the	  Carnegie	  
Foundation	  for	  the	  Advancement	  of	  Teaching	  to	  fund	  a	  study	  of	  college	  sports	  
conducted	  by	  Howard	  Savage	  in	  1929,	  which	  consisted	  of	  interviews	  and	  surveys	  
with	  university	  faculty,	  athletic	  directors,	  coaches,	  admissions	  staff,	  and	  financial	  aid	  
offices.	  In	  addition,	  newspapers,	  university	  documentation,	  and	  press	  statements	  
were	  compiled	  in	  this	  large	  study	  of	  112	  institutions.	  The	  Carnegie	  Study	  concluded	  
that	  81	  of	  those	  universities	  were	  paying	  athletes	  through	  reserved	  jobs,	  
scholarships,	  loans,	  and	  money,	  sometimes	  vying	  for	  athletes	  with	  outright	  
scholarship	  offers	  (Sack	  and	  Staurowski,	  36-­‐7).	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  study	  included	  
schools	  that	  are	  today	  members	  of	  Division	  III,	  which	  comprises	  over	  40	  percent	  of	  
the	  members	  of	  the	  NCAA,	  the	  only	  division	  which	  preserves	  the	  ideals	  of	  
amateurism	  in	  its	  intended	  fashion	  (www.ncaa.org).	  This	  means	  that	  almost	  all	  of	  
those	  schools	  which	  today	  make	  up	  Division	  I	  and	  II,	  where	  scholarships	  are	  now	  
allowed,	  were	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  some	  form	  illegal	  compensation.	  In	  many	  
instances,	  donors	  would	  give	  money	  to	  financial	  aid	  offices	  that	  was	  specifically	  
reserved	  for	  athletes.	  “College	  sports	  have	  become	  theatrical	  in	  the	  business	  sense	  
and	  the	  public	  has	  a	  vested	  right	  to	  a	  team	  that	  will	  win”	  (Savage,	  215).	  It	  was	  
becoming	  increasingly	  clear	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	  college	  athletics	  greater	  than	  the	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moral	  weight	  of	  preserving	  amateurism.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  NCAA’s	  rules	  were	  being	  
almost	  unanimously	  ignored	  sounded	  a	  significant	  alarm	  about	  the	  general	  dodging	  
of	  regulation	  within	  highly	  competitive	  college	  sports.	  
Scandals	  became	  rampant	  during	  the	  1930s	  and	  conferences,	  wishing	  to	  
avoid	  poor	  publicity,	  began	  taking	  action,	  sometimes	  even	  ejecting	  members	  (Sarkes	  
and	  Staurowski,	  38).	  Since	  the	  NCAA	  did	  not	  have	  any	  sanctioning	  power,	  
conference	  boards,	  which	  were	  often	  comprised	  of	  athletic	  directors	  at	  that	  time,	  
were	  the	  only	  real	  form	  of	  governance	  and,	  thus,	  the	  only	  avenue	  for	  reform.	  Frank	  
Graham,	  president	  of	  the	  Southern	  Conference,	  presented	  drafted	  regulations	  to	  
curb	  the	  type	  of	  violations	  presented	  in	  the	  Carnegie	  study.	  He	  asked	  the	  conference	  
members	  in	  1935	  to	  approve	  rules	  including	  that	  “no	  athlete	  shall	  use	  his	  name	  for	  
commercial	  advertising,	  sell	  game	  tickets,	  hold	  a	  sinecure	  job,	  receive	  more	  for	  a	  job	  
than	  the	  regular	  rate,	  or	  accept	  counterfeit	  bets”	  (as	  qtd	  in	  Duderstadt,	  59).	  History,	  
however,	  was	  to	  repeat	  itself	  as	  the	  Graham	  plan	  fell	  through,	  since	  it	  received	  no	  
backing	  from	  the	  other	  members	  of	  the	  board.	  This	  plan,	  however,	  was	  not	  entirely	  
unsuccessful	  as	  it	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  the	  Big	  Ten	  and	  Ivy	  League	  to	  agree	  not	  to	  
withhold	  scholarship	  funds	  for	  athletes	  in	  1942,	  which	  the	  NCAA	  commended.	  
These	  actions	  are	  some	  of	  the	  only	  deeds	  toward	  preserving	  amateurism;	  the	  key,	  
however,	  is	  that	  they	  were	  once	  again	  not	  interested	  in	  protecting	  amateurism	  for	  
the	  sake	  of	  the	  ideology	  behind	  it,	  but,	  as	  always,	  for	  protecting	  public	  image.	  The	  
scandals	  were	  attracting	  negative	  attention	  to	  college	  sports	  and	  hurt	  their	  growth,	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especially	  as	  compared	  to	  professional	  sports,	  which	  had	  fewer	  regulations	  and,	  
consequently,	  an	  easier	  path	  to	  successful	  expansion	  (Sarkes	  and	  Staurowski,	  43).	  
In	  1943,	  at	  its	  annual	  conference,	  the	  NCAA	  decided	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  
restore	  balance	  (read:	  good	  publicity)	  in	  intercollegiate	  athletics	  was	  by	  abandoning	  
a	  42-­‐year	  commitment	  to	  amateurism	  and	  allowing	  athletic	  scholarships	  provided	  
that	  the	  athletes	  qualify	  for	  need.	  This	  was	  to	  stop	  disagreement	  among	  conferences	  
about	  appropriate	  regulation	  implementation	  and	  was	  called	  the	  Sanity	  Code.	  The	  
1948	  conference	  also	  crated	  the	  first	  NCAA	  enforcement	  body,	  the	  Constitutional	  
Compliance	  Committee,	  which	  was	  created	  to	  make	  rulings	  regarding	  
interpretations	  of	  regulation	  language	  and	  determine	  whether	  certain	  practices	  are	  
forbidden	  by	  the	  NCAA	  constitution	  (Duderstadt,	  71).	  This	  committee	  was	  given	  the	  
power	  to	  terminate	  membership	  if	  deemed	  appropriate	  by	  a	  two-­‐thirds	  majority	  
vote.	  This	  was	  the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  NCAA	  to	  become	  an	  effective	  governing	  body	  
over	  intercollegiate	  athletics	  and	  gain	  true	  power	  of	  implementation	  over	  its	  
member	  institutions	  (Sarkes	  and	  Saurowski,	  45).	  
In	  1950,	  at	  the	  NCAA	  convention,	  the	  Compliance	  Committee	  put	  7	  schools	  up	  
for	  a	  dismissal	  vote	  because	  of	  continued	  violations	  of	  the	  Sanity	  Code,	  one	  year	  
after	  being	  ordered	  to	  reform	  their	  programs.	  Although	  a	  simple	  majority	  vote	  was	  
reached,	  it	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  actually	  expel	  the	  schools	  from	  the	  Association	  
(Duderstadt,	  73).	  Even	  after	  the	  compromise	  reached	  by	  the	  Sanity	  Code,	  most	  
school	  administrators	  were	  still	  unhappy	  with	  the	  production	  of	  their	  athletes	  
without	  scholarships.	  Since	  the	  Committee	  failed	  to	  perform	  its	  duties	  and	  actually	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sanction	  schools	  in	  violation	  of	  NCAA	  policy,	  the	  individual	  universities	  took	  over	  
the	  task	  of	  governing	  themselves.	  In	  fact,	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan,	  among	  other	  
schools,	  reinstated	  their	  old	  aid	  policies	  because	  their	  teams	  had	  started	  losing.	  By	  
1957	  Walter	  Byers,	  the	  first	  executive	  director	  of	  the	  NCAA,	  had	  passed	  legislation	  
that	  allows	  schools	  to	  pay	  room,	  board,	  tuition,	  and	  fees	  for	  their	  athletes	  while	  they	  
would	  still	  be	  called	  amateurs,	  although	  this	  was	  previously	  condemned	  as	  
professionalism.	  The	  fifty-­‐year	  transformation	  was	  complete	  (Sarkes	  and	  
Staurowski,	  48).	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  a	  non-­‐employer	  status,	  at	  this	  time,	  the	  term	  
“student-­‐athlete”	  was	  created	  along	  with	  “college	  team”	  so	  that	  the	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  gifts	  
could	  not	  be	  legally	  defined	  as	  contracts	  for	  hire.	  “The	  label	  ‘student-­‐athlete’	  is	  mere	  
window	  dressing	  for	  individuals	  who,	  in	  substance,	  are	  employees”	  (McCormick,	  
137).	  Byers	  described	  this	  after	  his	  retirement	  as	  “the	  beginning	  of	  a	  nationwide	  
money-­‐laundering	  scheme”	  (Byers,	  73.	  McCormick,	  83).	  Although	  this	  option	  was	  
made	  available	  for	  all	  schools,	  some	  of	  the	  schools	  chose	  to	  maintain	  the	  original	  
ideal	  of	  unpaid	  amateurs	  and	  joined	  Division	  III	  in	  1973	  (ncaa.org).	  
Under	  Walter	  Byers,	  the	  NCAA	  increased	  its	  governing	  power	  over	  its	  
members	  as	  it	  took	  over	  the	  promotional	  aspect	  of	  the	  games.	  In	  1967	  the	  NCAA	  
passed	  legislation	  stating	  that	  being	  absent	  at	  practice	  or	  failing	  to	  participate	  in	  
athletics	  fully	  was	  fraudulent	  and	  contrary	  to	  admissions	  applications	  letters	  of	  
intent	  and	  constituted	  ground	  for	  termination	  of	  financial	  aid,	  athletic	  or	  not.	  The	  
moral	  argument	  behind	  this	  ruling	  seems	  justifiable	  under	  the	  ideals	  that	  should	  be	  
set	  for	  appropriate	  conduct	  of	  college	  students	  (Sarkes	  and	  Staurowski,	  82).	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However,	  given	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  this	  rule,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  NCAA	  
was	  effectively	  trying	  to	  maintain	  a	  status	  as	  a	  non-­‐profit	  organization,	  while	  
continuing	  to	  recruit	  top-­‐notch	  players	  that	  would	  bring	  them	  attention	  given	  
emerging	  television	  contracts	  (Byers,	  80).	  “The	  NCAA	  had	  given	  member	  
institutions	  far	  greater	  control	  over	  the	  college	  athlete	  workforce,”	  which	  is	  what	  
allowed	  it	  to	  gain	  power	  of	  implementation	  over	  its	  member	  institutions	  (Sarkes	  
and	  Stuaurowski,	  84).	  Further	  details	  of	  the	  legal	  implications	  of	  this	  transformation	  
will	  be	  discussed	  the	  legal	  section	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  NCAA’s	  newfound	  popularity	  
with	  the	  universities	  allowed	  it	  to	  have	  more	  control,	  while	  its	  protective	  blanket	  
allowed	  further	  opportunities	  for	  growth	  for	  institutions	  interested	  in	  competing	  at	  
the	  highest	  level	  (Branch,	  20).	  The	  Association	  had	  effectively	  gained	  monopoly	  over	  
the	  scheduling	  of	  intercollegiate	  games	  because	  of	  its	  assumed	  role	  as	  television	  
contract	  negotiator	  by	  the	  early	  1970s.	  	  
Trying	  to	  control	  attendance	  at	  football	  games,	  the	  NCAA	  instituted	  the	  
Football	  Game	  of	  the	  Week,	  allowing	  only	  one	  college	  game	  to	  be	  broadcasted	  each	  
week	  on	  national	  television.	  When	  several	  colleges	  rebelled	  and	  formed	  the	  College	  
Football	  Association	  (CFA),	  the	  NCAA	  responded	  by	  revoking	  those	  schools’	  
membership	  and	  banning	  them	  from	  competing	  with	  any	  member	  schools	  in	  any	  
competition.	  While	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  ruled	  this	  a	  restriction	  of	  trade	  and	  gave	  the	  
conferences	  control	  of	  television	  scheduling	  in	  1984,	  they	  allowed	  the	  NCAA	  to	  have	  
a	  monopoly	  over	  the	  scheduling	  of	  games	  among	  members	  by	  dissolving	  the	  CFA.	  
This	  meant	  that	  the	  NCAA	  kept	  immunity	  from	  anti-­‐trust	  legislation	  because	  of	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compliance	  with	  the	  court’s	  order	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  television	  contracts	  (Epstein,	  
367).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  the	  NCAA	  must	  govern	  post-­‐season	  play	  
as	  it	  occurs	  in	  an	  inter-­‐conference	  format.	  This	  allowed	  the	  Association	  to	  remain	  
immune	  from	  the	  Sherman	  Anti-­‐trust	  Act,	  while	  still	  acting	  as	  a	  cartel.	  
In	  addition,	  while	  it	  is	  commendable	  that	  colleges	  are	  paying	  for	  the	  expenses	  
of	  college	  athletes	  because	  they	  bring	  a	  valuable	  skill	  to	  the	  university	  setting,	  
maintaining	  the	  amateur	  status	  is	  contradictory.	  The	  status	  allows	  the	  university	  
and	  the	  NCAA	  to	  put	  limitations	  on	  the	  amount	  that	  is	  paid	  to	  these	  athletes	  so	  that	  
they	  can	  continue	  to	  exploit	  them	  (Branch,	  15).	  If	  they	  can	  maintain	  a	  cap	  on	  the	  
amount	  of	  compensation	  for	  tuition,	  then	  they	  can	  spend	  more	  of	  their	  profit	  on	  
getting	  and	  paying	  professional-­‐caliber	  star	  coaches	  and	  reap	  more	  money	  for	  
themselves	  from	  advertisement,	  merchandise,	  and	  broadcasting.	  Moreover,	  since	  
the	  payers	  are	  not	  able	  to	  receive	  compensation	  during	  the	  off-­‐season	  and	  summer,	  
they	  are	  being	  denied	  another	  right	  that	  most	  students	  engaged	  in	  skill-­‐based	  extra-­‐
curricular	  activities,	  such	  as	  musicians,	  enjoy.	  This	  is	  yet	  another	  effective	  dialectic	  
that	  fueled	  the	  NCAA’s	  expansion	  as	  a	  moneymaking	  organization	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  previous	  century	  (Duderstadt,	  74).	  
The	  same	  year	  as	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  ruling,	  the	  NCAA	  signed	  a	  contract	  with	  
CBS	  for	  the	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  broadcast	  the	  basketball	  tournament,	  which	  Byers	  
had	  expanded	  from	  8	  teams	  to	  32	  and	  later	  to	  65.	  The	  contract	  was	  worth	  a	  
whopping	  $1	  billion	  dollars,	  none	  of	  which	  was	  intended	  for	  the	  players	  that	  would	  
be	  broadcasted	  (Byers,	  70).	  Of	  course,	  since	  they	  were	  amateurs,	  they	  also	  had	  no	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rights	  to	  any	  sought-­‐after	  highlight	  footage	  that	  may	  be	  worth	  hundreds	  of	  
thousands	  of	  dollars	  in	  advertising,	  even	  decades	  after	  they	  had	  graduated	  from	  
college.	  Furthermore,	  since	  they	  are	  cogs	  in	  the	  college	  sports	  machine,	  they	  could	  
be	  asked	  to	  play	  games	  at	  whatever	  times	  allowed	  television	  coverage	  of	  the	  most	  
games	  for	  each	  conference,	  resulting	  in	  players	  traveling	  across	  states	  twice	  a	  week	  
and	  playing	  games	  as	  early	  as	  9	  AM	  and	  as	  late	  as	  1	  AM,	  while	  allegedly	  being	  
enrolled	  to	  get	  a	  quality	  higher-­‐level	  education.	  The	  amateur	  status	  had	  been	  
abused	  even	  further	  after	  75	  years	  by	  the	  organization	  that	  was	  created	  to	  protect	  it	  
and	  the	  students	  bearing	  it	  (Duderstadt,	  114).	  
All	  of	  this	  reform	  and	  increased	  implementation	  power	  by	  the	  NCAA	  did	  not	  
make	  the	  organization	  operate	  under	  a	  more	  appropriate	  moral	  framework.	  As	  
famous	  basketball	  coach,	  Bobby	  Knight	  stated,	  “collegiate	  amateurism	  is	  not	  a	  moral	  
issue.	  It	  is	  an	  economic	  camouflage	  for	  monopoly	  practice”	  (as	  qtd	  in	  Zimbalist,	  19).	  
More	  revenue	  generated	  from	  advertisers	  and	  television	  in	  the	  1980s	  meant	  that	  
more	  scandals	  of	  illegal	  player	  compensation	  went	  on.	  A	  survey	  of	  football	  players	  
conducted	  by	  Walter	  Byers	  in	  1989	  revealed	  that	  48	  percent	  of	  them	  received	  illegal	  
payments	  for	  their	  services.	  Two	  years	  later,	  the	  University	  of	  Kentucky	  was	  caught	  
delivering	  payment	  when	  an	  unmarked	  package	  addressed	  to	  a	  potential	  recruit	  fell	  
out	  of	  the	  delivery	  truck	  and	  $1000	  dollars	  spilled	  out	  of	  it	  (Byers,	  92).	  The	  level	  of	  
competitiveness	  in	  the	  increasingly	  popular	  college	  athletic	  leagues	  also	  led	  to	  an	  
increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  scandals,	  which	  meant	  that	  as	  more	  money	  came	  in,	  it	  
became	  increasingly	  important	  to	  keep	  enforcing	  rules	  against	  illegal	  activities	  so	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that	  the	  media	  attention	  would	  not	  shift	  too	  far	  toward	  the	  scandalous	  side	  and	  
reduce	  advertisement	  revenues.	  However,	  between	  1991	  and	  1992	  the	  NCAA	  spent	  
$1.9	  million	  dollars	  on	  enforcement,	  $2.5	  million	  on	  legal	  and	  government	  affairs,	  
$2.5	  million	  on	  public	  relations,	  and	  $1.9	  million	  on	  committee	  entertainment	  
(Brown,	  27-­‐34).	  When	  contrasting	  this	  budgeting	  to	  the	  initial	  purpose	  of	  the	  NCAA	  
to	  protect	  assure	  compliance	  to	  regulations	  that	  are	  intended	  for	  the	  players’	  well-­‐
being,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  true	  mission	  of	  the	  Association	  had	  shifted	  drastically.	  The	  
NCAA	  had	  become	  more	  interested	  in	  maintaining	  their	  revenue	  streams,	  rather	  
than	  ensuring	  that	  amateurism	  is	  enforced	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  its	  importance	  to	  higher	  
education,	  which	  had	  allegedly	  been	  a	  100-­‐year	  commitment.	  
With	  CBS	  paying	  the	  NCAA	  $6	  billion	  dollars	  over	  eleven	  years	  in	  1999	  for	  
the	  broadcasting	  rights	  to	  the	  basketball	  tournament	  and	  the	  Final	  Four	  brand	  
receiving	  $550	  million	  in	  2000	  from	  merchandise	  alone,	  it	  is	  understandable	  that	  
the	  NCAA	  continues	  to	  strive	  for	  even	  more	  publicity	  and	  money.	  The	  NCAA	  has	  
increased	  its	  revenue	  from	  television,	  licensing,	  and	  scholarship	  funds	  by	  more	  than	  
8000	  percent	  in	  the	  period	  between	  1980	  and	  2000,	  which	  of	  course	  is	  free	  of	  taxes	  
because	  of	  the	  non-­‐profit	  status	  of	  the	  institution	  (Duderstadt,	  118-­‐9).	  In	  2010,	  the	  
new	  contract	  with	  CBS	  was	  worth	  $11	  billion	  over	  14	  years	  (Branch,	  5).	  	  This	  means	  
that	  in	  the	  last	  few	  decades,	  the	  NCAA	  has	  become	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prosperous	  
leagues	  anywhere	  in	  sports.	  However,	  this	  league	  does	  not	  use	  any	  of	  its	  money	  to	  
pay	  the	  individuals	  who	  make	  all	  of	  this	  possible,	  the	  individuals	  that	  spark	  the	  
interest	  of	  so	  many	  fans	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  spend	  significant	  portions	  of	  their	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income	  to	  support	  this	  growing	  system.	  Organizational	  reform	  toward	  
compensating	  the	  athletes,	  therefore,	  will	  never	  begin	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  NCAA	  
because	  their	  profit	  margin	  would	  suffer	  greatly,	  as	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  their	  
budget	  would	  have	  to	  be	  shifted	  toward	  player	  contracts.	  
Schools	  receive	  sizeable	  amounts	  of	  money	  from	  the	  NCAA	  in	  years	  when	  
they	  are	  not	  paying	  it	  back	  in	  large	  quantities	  due	  to	  violations	  of	  its	  bylaws,	  making	  
it	  difficult	  for	  them	  to	  take	  a	  stand	  against	  the	  commercialized	  nature	  of	  the	  NCAA.	  
The	  media	  has	  played	  an	  interesting	  role	  in	  college	  athletics,	  on	  one	  hand	  promoting	  
them	  and	  paying	  billions	  to	  the	  NCAA	  and	  its	  conferences,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  feeding	  
the	  public	  all	  of	  the	  exciting	  scandals.	  This	  only	  means	  that	  they	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  
manipulate	  all	  of	  the	  NCAA	  governing	  bodies,	  conference	  boards,	  athletic	  directors,	  
and	  college	  presidents	  because	  of	  the	  appeal	  that	  college	  sports	  bring	  to	  these	  
universities.	  It	  had	  become	  increasingly	  apparent	  that	  the	  expectations	  of	  behavior	  
for	  student-­‐athletes	  increased	  in	  the	  media	  age	  with	  press	  conferences	  being	  fed	  
players	  for	  interviews	  after	  every	  game	  (Duderstadt,	  77).	  Internet	  coverage,	  
combined	  with	  big	  sponsors	  paying	  universities	  directly	  has	  provided	  too	  many	  
incentives	  for	  universities	  to	  remain	  involved	  in	  the	  show	  business	  of	  big-­‐time	  
collegiate	  athletics.	  In	  addition	  to	  incentives	  for	  publicity,	  when	  schools	  perform	  
well	  in	  during	  their	  seasons,	  tournaments,	  or	  championship	  bowl	  games,	  they	  can	  
receive	  between	  tens	  of	  thousands	  and	  millions	  of	  dollars	  in	  bonuses,	  all	  of	  which	  
stays	  within	  the	  department	  and	  does	  not	  actually	  benefit	  the	  school	  in	  the	  way	  that	  
revenue	  from	  a	  modestly	  paid	  professor’s	  research	  would	  (Brown,	  150).	  Much	  of	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this	  money	  actually	  goes	  to	  their	  celebrity	  football	  and	  basketball	  coaches	  in	  
Division	  I-­‐A,	  which	  have	  enjoyed	  an	  average	  increase	  in	  annual	  base	  salary	  of	  80%	  
in	  the	  5-­‐year	  period	  between	  1998	  and	  2003	  to	  a	  figure	  of	  $388,000.	  In	  2009	  
football	  coaches	  earned	  a	  average	  of	  $1.36	  million	  in	  yearly	  salary	  (Porto,	  3).	  In	  
basketball,	  the	  situation	  is	  far	  more	  inflated	  with	  coach	  Rick	  Pitino	  of	  the	  recent	  
national	  champion	  Louisville	  basketball	  team	  bringing	  in	  an	  astounding	  $4.2	  million	  
dollars	  per	  year.	  These	  pay-­‐stubs	  also	  show	  that	  athletic	  programs	  are	  absolutely	  
dependent	  on	  their	  coaches,	  which	  is	  why	  they	  devote	  their	  facilities	  so	  that	  they	  
may	  hold	  clinics	  and	  camps	  to	  earn	  more	  profits	  on	  top	  of	  their	  multi-­‐million	  dollar	  
salary	  contracts	  (Duderstadt,	  154).	  Successful	  schools	  can	  also	  diversify	  their	  
revenue	  streams	  by	  selling	  merchandise	  or	  rights	  to	  commercial	  space	  for	  sponsors.	  	  
McDonalds	  paid	  Georgia	  Tech	  $5.5	  million	  in	  1995	  just	  to	  display	  its	  arches	  on	  the	  
inside	  and	  outside	  of	  their	  basketball	  arena.	  The	  University	  of	  Kentucky	  made	  $5	  
million	  per	  year	  between	  1996	  and	  2000	  off	  of	  merchandise	  alone	  after	  winning	  the	  
national	  basketball	  tournament	  (Sarkes	  and	  Staurowski,	  91-­‐2).	  After	  winning	  again	  
in	  2012,	  Kentucky	  has	  already	  accrued	  $8	  million	  from	  merchandise	  royalties	  
(businessweek.com).	  	  
Although	  much	  of	  this	  profit	  is	  allegedly	  used	  to	  fund	  other,	  non	  revenue-­‐
producing	  sports	  and	  various	  campus	  improvements,	  that	  is	  not	  entirely	  true.	  The	  
universities’	  investment	  in	  big-­‐time	  sports	  can	  lead	  them	  to	  re-­‐invest	  their	  money	  
into	  the	  two	  big	  sports,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Michigan	  University’s	  $226	  million	  dollar	  
renovation	  of	  its	  football	  stadium	  in	  2010	  (Branch,	  19).	  These	  astronomical	  prices	  
combined	  with	  sponsorship	  income	  and	  the	  misappropriation	  of	  these	  revenues	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makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  the	  universities	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  well	  being	  or	  
educational	  goals	  of	  its	  student-­‐athletes	  over	  its	  investment	  to	  stay	  at	  the	  top	  of	  big-­‐
time	  sports.	  
All	  of	  the	  factors	  in	  commercial	  college	  sports	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  be	  opposed	  
to	  taking	  a	  stand	  against	  the	  misuse	  of	  amateurism	  or	  to	  the	  unfair	  lack	  of	  
compensation	  to	  the	  athletes	  that	  generate	  billions.	  During	  the	  history	  of	  this	  
nation’s	  universities,	  the	  atmosphere	  around	  the	  fields	  of	  athletic	  competition	  has	  
warped	  significantly.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  athletes	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  universities,	  the	  
NCAA,	  the	  media,	  and	  the	  fans	  of	  the	  sport	  has	  changed	  drastically.	  Yet	  through	  all	  of	  
this,	  the	  amateur	  status	  has	  been	  preserved.	  To	  be	  sure,	  this	  is	  only	  in	  name,	  as	  the	  
changes	  that	  had	  occurred	  in	  its	  working	  definition	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  compare	  it	  to	  
the	  origins	  of	  the	  word.	  There	  is	  great	  moral	  value	  to	  preserving	  college	  athletics	  in	  
the	  manner	  that	  they	  were	  intended	  initially,	  before	  commercialism	  and	  capitalism	  
took	  over,	  as	  Division	  III	  preserves	  it.	  However,	  continually	  insisting	  on	  this	  status	  
so	  that	  profits	  can	  pour	  in	  without	  compensation	  to	  those	  that	  attract	  fans	  is	  an	  
insult	  to	  the	  ideology	  behind	  amateurism.	  Ultimately,	  the	  educational	  goals	  of	  the	  
universities,	  and	  the	  financial	  goals	  of	  athletic	  departments	  and	  the	  Association	  have	  
become	  separated;	  yet	  amateurism	  continues	  to	  exist	  as	  the	  common	  bridge	  
because	  of	  its	  functionality.	  Without	  giving	  these	  athletes	  a	  choice,	  the	  NCAA	  and	  
universities	  at	  the	  Division	  I	  level	  have	  tossed	  aside	  their	  commitment	  to	  education	  
for	  the	  prospect	  of	  publicity	  and	  revenue.	  In	  football	  and	  basketball	  at	  the	  Division	  I	  
level,	  over	  a	  century	  after	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  NCAA,	  amateurism	  is	  dead.	  In	  such	  an	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environment,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  see	  how	  universities	  can	  see	  past	  the	  financial	  
bottom	  line,	  visibility,	  and	  athletic	  competitiveness	  and	  find	  the	  integrity	  to	  insist	  on	  
the	  primacy	  of	  academic	  objectives	  and	  values.	  	  
	  
2.	  The	  Legal	  Path	  to	  Today’s	  Amateurism	  and	  Its	  Chains	  
Amateurism’s	  history	  presents	  its	  ideals	  as	  being	  disconnected	  from	  the	  
current	  stated	  goals	  of	  the	  NCAA.	  The	  existing	  system	  promotes	  the	  idea	  of	  cheating	  
because	  of	  the	  hypocritical	  practices	  of	  the	  Association,	  which	  allow	  the	  athletic	  
programs	  to	  interact	  in	  a	  manner	  similar	  to	  professional	  sports,	  while	  insisting	  that	  
they	  are	  amateur.	  A	  number	  of	  court	  cases	  have	  contributed	  to	  creating	  and	  
maintaining	  this	  status,	  partly	  through	  the	  help	  of	  carefully	  orchestrated	  rhetoric	  
and	  the	  manipulation	  of	  legal	  concepts	  by	  the	  Association’s	  lawyers.	  The	  key	  to	  
reform,	  however,	  still	  lies	  in	  the	  courts,	  despite	  their	  previous	  conservative	  
approach	  that	  has	  defined	  the	  NCAA	  as	  a	  revenue-­‐generating	  non-­‐profit	  that	  is	  
fueled	  by	  volunteer	  athletes.	  
	  In	  1960	  Edward	  Van	  Horn,	  a	  scholarship	  football	  player	  at	  California	  State	  
Polytechnic	  College	  was	  killed	  in	  a	  plane	  crash	  while	  returning	  from	  a	  game	  in	  Ohio.	  
His	  scholarship	  came	  from	  a	  booster	  club,	  which	  paid	  athletes	  per	  the	  coach’s	  
recommendation,	  which	  was	  legitimized	  by	  the	  NCAA	  in	  1956	  (Sarkes	  and	  
Staurowski,	  80).	  The	  scholarships	  had	  minimum	  GPA	  requirements	  and	  covered	  
tuition,	  books,	  and	  some	  apartment	  rental	  fees.	  Van	  Horn	  had	  a	  family	  and	  needed	  
the	  money	  from	  his	  football	  scholarship	  (Duderstadt,	  73).	  When	  his	  family	  sued	  for	  
death	  benefits	  from	  the	  athlete’s	  employer,	  the	  university	  argued	  before	  the	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California	  District	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  that	  the	  yearlong	  scholarship	  had	  been	  a	  gift,	  not	  
dependent	  upon	  participation,	  which	  did	  not	  make	  it	  an	  employment	  contract.	  The	  
court	  ruled,	  however,	  that	  because	  some	  degree	  of	  athletic	  prowess	  was	  necessary	  
for	  the	  scholarship	  to	  be	  awarded,	  it	  constituted	  an	  employment	  contract.	  The	  court	  
also	  noted	  previous	  jurisprudence	  that	  said	  that	  college	  students	  may	  have	  the	  dual	  
capacity	  of	  an	  employee	  and	  student.	  Based	  on	  these	  facts,	  the	  court	  ordered	  that	  
death	  benefits	  be	  paid	  to	  Van	  Horn’s	  family	  (Van	  Horn	  v.	  Industrial	  Accident	  
Commission).	  
This	  case	  prompted	  Walter	  Byers	  to	  contact	  Marcus	  Plant,	  a	  notable	  tort	  
expert	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Law	  School	  to	  draft	  a	  plan	  to	  guide	  the	  NCAA	  
through	  worker’s	  compensation	  torts	  over	  the	  following	  twenty	  years.	  The	  language	  
of	  the	  grants-­‐in-­‐aid	  had	  to	  be	  evaluated	  by	  attorneys.	  The	  grants	  needed	  to	  refer	  to	  
the	  NCAA	  Constitution,	  which	  also	  mandated	  that	  they	  be	  described	  as	  gifts	  after	  the	  
Van	  Horn	  (Sarkes	  and	  Staurowski,	  80-­‐2).	  In	  1967	  the	  NCAA	  also	  eliminated	  four-­‐
year	  scholarships	  so	  that	  athletes	  would	  not	  begin	  slacking	  in	  school	  or	  on	  the	  field,	  
knowing	  that	  they	  are	  getting	  a	  full	  ride	  (Byers,	  83).	  In	  fact,	  these	  efforts	  were	  made	  
so	  that	  coaches	  would	  have	  more	  control	  over	  who	  got	  compensated.	  “This	  way	  the	  
NCAA	  could	  have	  it	  both	  ways”	  (Sarkes	  and	  Staurowski	  83):	  schools	  would	  not	  lose	  
money	  to	  athletes	  who	  got	  injured	  early	  on	  or	  failed	  to	  develop	  as	  expected.	  It	  is	  
clear	  that	  the	  format	  by	  which	  the	  scholarships	  were	  awarded	  did	  not	  change	  in	  the	  
least	  following	  the	  Van	  Horn	  decision,	  but	  what	  did	  change	  was	  the	  language	  
describing	  them.	  This	  effort	  to	  avoid	  legal	  action	  and	  responsibility	  without	  
question	  goes	  against	  the	  NCAA’s	  stated	  goals	  of	  protecting	  the	  interests	  of	  the	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student-­‐athlete	  and	  takes	  away	  their	  rights	  to	  compensation	  for	  injury	  so	  that	  the	  
universities	  and	  the	  Association	  can	  keep	  more	  of	  their	  money.	  Theodore	  
Roosevelt’s	  effort	  to	  curb	  injury	  in	  intercollegiate	  athletics	  in	  1905	  by	  creating	  the	  
NCAA	  was	  clearly	  of	  little	  concern	  to	  the	  governing	  board	  of	  the	  Association	  in	  the	  
1960s.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  actions	  that	  were	  deemed	  to	  be	  employment	  by	  the	  
California	  District	  Court	  did	  not	  change,	  which	  means	  that	  effectively,	  student-­‐
athletes	  receiving	  scholarships	  today	  are	  actually	  being	  compensated	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
violates	  amateurism,	  whereby	  the	  hypocrisy	  of	  the	  NCAA	  is	  once	  again	  visible.	  	  
At	  that	  time,	  college	  football	  received	  considerable	  national	  attention,	  while	  
basketball	  was	  not	  yet	  part	  of	  the	  main	  stage	  in	  college	  sports.	  Walter	  Byers,	  the	  first	  
NCAA	  President,	  presiding	  for	  the	  decades	  between	  the	  1960s	  and	  1980s,	  tried	  to	  
stop	  the	  commercial	  aspect	  of	  intercollegiate	  sports,	  while	  still	  improving	  the	  
infrastructure	  and	  providing	  the	  best	  arena	  for	  expanding	  competition	  for	  all	  sports.	  	  
As	  he	  began	  to	  understand	  the	  commercial	  promise	  of	  collegiate	  football,	  
Byers	  attempted	  to	  do	  away	  with	  amateurism	  and	  allow	  professionalism	  to	  take	  the	  
stage.	  His	  proposal	  was	  voted	  down	  by	  the	  NCAA	  committee	  because	  of	  the	  difficulty	  
of	  removing	  the	  sport	  that	  drove	  the	  expansion	  of	  intercollegiate	  sports	  without	  
changing	  the	  public	  idea	  of	  what	  motivates	  schools	  to	  maintain	  amateurism.	  If	  one	  
intercollegiate	  sport	  made	  up	  of	  student-­‐athletes	  were	  to	  be	  removed,	  then	  it	  would	  
make	  it	  impossible	  to	  continue	  making	  legal	  claims	  for	  the	  moral	  importance	  of	  
preserving	  amateurism	  in	  a	  revenue-­‐generating	  sport.	  The	  rising	  price	  of	  television	  
contracts	  along	  with	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  sport	  also	  made	  it	  difficult	  for	  the	  
members	  to	  allow	  the	  sport	  to	  become	  professional	  and	  pay	  the	  athletes.	  As	  a	  well-­‐
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crafted	  network	  of	  regulations	  at	  the	  NCAA	  and	  university	  level	  safely	  began	  
insulating	  the	  status	  of	  student-­‐athlete,	  courts	  began	  to	  render	  similar	  decisions	  
regarding	  their	  employment	  status.	  Since	  the	  courts	  were	  supporting	  this	  new	  
brand	  of	  amateurism,	  it	  further	  allowed	  the	  other	  members	  of	  the	  NCAA	  to	  oppose	  
Byers’	  proposal	  and	  continue	  expanding.	  
In	  1983,	  three	  cases	  confirmed	  the	  fixed	  jurisprudence	  of	  United	  States	  
courts.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Rensing	  v.	  Indiana	  State	  University,	  a	  football	  player	  became	  
paralyzed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  football	  injury	  and	  sued	  for	  compensation	  as	  part	  of	  his	  
alleged	  employment,	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  was	  a	  scholarship-­‐earning	  athlete.	  The	  
Indiana	  Supreme	  Court	  decided	  that	  there	  was	  no	  employment	  relationship	  due	  to	  
the	  language	  surrounding	  the	  grant	  he	  received,	  therefore	  no	  workman’s	  
compensation	  was	  in	  order.	  The	  court	  argued	  that	  financial	  aid	  is	  not	  “pay”	  since	  the	  
award	  was	  legal	  under	  the	  NCAA’s	  rules,	  and	  those	  rules	  also	  strictly	  prohibited	  
taking	  pay	  for	  sports.	  The	  circular	  logic	  employed	  by	  the	  courts	  is	  quite	  apparent	  in	  
this	  case	  since	  it	  gives	  the	  NCAA	  the	  power	  to	  define	  financial	  aid	  and	  pay,	  
regardless	  of	  any	  other	  existing	  definitions,	  giving	  the	  NCAA	  full	  immunity	  from	  any	  
legal	  action.	  Rensing’s	  claim	  that	  this	  should	  be	  considered	  income	  was	  also	  denied	  
because	  he	  did	  not	  report	  this	  on	  his	  income	  tax	  return	  (Rensing	  v.	  Indiana	  State	  
University).	  	  The	  Michigan	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  rejected	  the	  assertion	  that	  
intercollegiate	  athletics	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  university’s	  primary	  business	  of	  education	  
and	  research	  in	  Coleman	  vs.	  Western	  Michigan	  University,	  thereby	  disallowing	  
workman’s	  compensation.	  To	  complete	  the	  trifecta,	  the	  Federal	  District	  Court	  of	  
Arizona	  denied	  student-­‐athletes	  eligibility	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  sport	  if	  the	  athletes	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received	  compensation	  for	  that	  sport	  in	  the	  past.	  After	  football	  players	  at	  the	  
University	  of	  Arizona	  were	  found	  to	  receive	  non-­‐scholarship	  pay	  for	  participating	  in	  
collegiate	  athletics,	  the	  NCAA	  fined	  them	  and	  prohibited	  post-­‐season	  play,	  an	  action	  
that	  became	  standard	  practice	  for	  such	  violations.	  Although	  the	  federal	  court	  stated	  
that	  amateur	  rules	  have	  a	  “substantial	  effect	  on	  interstate	  commerce,”	  they	  also	  
believed	  that	  the	  sanctions	  were	  “reasonably	  related	  to	  the	  NCAA’s	  goals	  of	  
preserving	  amateurism”	  (Justice	  v.	  NCAA).	  	  
While	  Rensing	  and	  Coleman	  solidified	  the	  student-­‐athlete	  as	  a	  non-­‐employee	  
participator	  in	  an	  activity	  that	  is	  non-­‐essential	  to	  university	  goals,	  Justice	  v.	  NCAA	  
delivered	  the	  final	  punch	  by	  limiting	  athletes’	  earning	  potential	  even	  further	  than	  
the	  abolition	  of	  four-­‐year	  scholarships.	  These	  athletes	  now	  became	  subject	  to	  a	  
contract	  to	  which	  they	  have	  no	  negotiation	  rights.	  Since	  Justice	  also	  determined	  that	  
the	  NCAA	  had	  power	  of	  sanctioning	  members	  that	  fail	  to	  abide	  by	  their	  bylaws,	  its	  
governing	  status	  had	  reached	  a	  level	  that	  would	  allow	  it	  to	  truly	  control	  the	  business	  
aspect	  of	  college	  sports.	  
This	  was	  true	  until	  1984,	  when	  the	  NCAA	  sued	  The	  University	  of	  Oklahoma	  
and	  The	  University	  of	  Georgia	  one	  year	  later	  because	  they	  violated	  the	  NCAA’s	  
wishes	  to	  control	  television	  broadcasting	  of	  football	  games.	  The	  Association	  wished	  
to	  limit	  broadcasting	  to	  28	  per	  year	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  level	  the	  playing	  field	  by	  
restricting	  appearances	  of	  big-­‐time	  schools.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  ruled	  that	  the	  
practice	  of	  “limiting	  television	  contracts	  to	  two	  networks	  was	  a	  violation	  of	  anti-­‐
trust	  laws”	  and	  was	  an	  “unreasonable	  restraint	  of	  competition”	  (NCAA	  v.	  Regents).	  
Writing	  for	  the	  majority,	  Justice	  John	  Paul	  Stevens	  argued	  that	  any	  restraint	  on	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economic	  competition	  “that	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  reducing	  the	  importance	  of	  consumer	  
preference	  in	  setting	  price	  and	  output	  is	  not	  consistent	  with	  the	  fundamental	  goal	  of	  
anti-­‐trust	  legislation”(NCAA	  v.	  Regents).	  While	  the	  decision	  was	  a	  loss	  for	  the	  NCAA	  
on	  paper,	  it	  allowed	  unlimited	  broadcast	  of	  football	  games	  on	  television,	  with	  the	  
scrutiny	  being	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  conferences,	  which	  meant	  significant	  increase	  in	  its	  
commercialization	  and	  revenue	  opportunities.	  	  
Once	  again,	  the	  NCAA	  had	  taken	  advantage	  of	  its	  legal	  knowledge	  to	  have	  it	  
both	  ways.	  Justice	  Byron	  White,	  writing	  in	  dissent	  said	  that	  it	  is	  unfortunate	  that	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  chose	  to	  view	  the	  NCAA	  as	  “a	  purely	  commercial	  venture	  in	  which	  
colleges	  and	  universities	  participate	  solely,	  or	  even	  primarily,	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  
profits,”	  and	  remained	  uninterested	  in	  “the	  NCAA’s	  fundamental	  policy	  of	  
preserving	  amateurism	  and	  integrating	  athletics	  and	  education”(NCAA	  v.	  Regents).	  
He	  went	  on	  to	  say	  that	  unlimited	  television	  appearance	  for	  a	  few	  colleges	  “would	  
inevitably	  give	  them	  an	  insuperable	  advantage	  over	  all	  others	  and	  in	  the	  end	  defeat	  
any	  efforts	  to	  maintain	  a	  system	  of	  athletic	  competition	  among	  amateurs	  who	  
measure	  up	  to	  college	  scholastic	  requirements”	  (NCAA	  v.	  Regents)	  As	  Justice	  White	  
predicted,	  the	  bigger-­‐profile	  conferences	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
promote	  themselves,	  thus	  increasing	  the	  awareness	  of	  a	  few	  big-­‐time	  teams	  that	  
began	  traveling	  across	  the	  country	  given	  newfound	  interest	  in	  the	  sport.	  With	  the	  
status	  of	  student-­‐athletes	  sealed	  in	  the	  courts	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  expand	  unrestricted	  
in	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  growing	  popularity	  and	  a	  rapidly	  expanding	  television	  business,	  
the	  Association’s	  path	  to	  commercial	  expansion	  without	  athlete	  compensation	  was	  
laid.	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The	  effects	  of	  this	  court	  decision	  were	  unbelievable.	  In	  the	  1970s	  the	  twin	  
cities	  of	  Minneapolis	  and	  St.	  Paul,	  Minnesota	  could	  enjoy	  up	  to	  two	  football	  games	  
per	  week,	  one	  on	  NBC	  and	  one	  on	  CBS.	  In	  2004,	  viewers	  from	  this	  area	  could	  gorge	  
themselves	  on	  thirteen	  football	  games	  on	  a	  given	  Saturday	  during	  the	  season.	  In	  
addition,	  many	  schools	  in	  Division	  1A	  had	  to	  increase	  athletic	  spending	  significantly	  
in	  the	  early	  2000s	  just	  to	  remain	  competitive	  in	  this	  hyper	  publicized	  atmosphere.	  
Between	  2000	  and	  2005,	  college	  athletic	  expenses	  in	  Division	  I	  rose	  by	  8	  percent	  
per	  year,	  while	  general	  college	  expenses	  rose	  by	  an	  average	  of	  3	  to	  4	  percent	  in	  the	  
same	  time	  period	  (Porto,	  81).	  Although	  the	  revenue	  also	  increased	  in	  the	  aftermath	  
of	  the	  Regents	  decision,	  the	  costs	  are	  becoming	  increasingly	  burdensome,	  
sometimes	  coming	  from	  students’	  athletic	  fees,	  but	  more	  often	  coming	  from	  
institutional	  subsidies.	  A	  2010	  Study	  showed	  that	  subsidies	  for	  athletics	  rose	  20	  
percent	  for	  those	  teams	  in	  Division	  I-­‐A	  after	  adjusting	  for	  inflation	  (Porto,	  7).	  All	  of	  
this	  indicates	  that	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Regents	  decision	  has	  brought	  forth	  more	  
pressure	  for	  big	  time	  college	  sports	  to	  expand	  into	  a	  professional	  league	  as	  it	  is	  
today;	  a	  league	  where	  money	  is	  absolutely	  key	  to	  staying	  afloat.	  At	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  
difficult	  to	  say	  that	  much	  of	  the	  hype	  about	  college	  sports	  is	  even	  about	  attracting	  
students	  as	  they	  were	  initially	  marketed.	  Most	  of	  that	  has	  been	  lost	  to	  the	  ever-­‐
growing	  commercial	  greed	  of	  many	  other	  companies	  that	  pay	  the	  universities	  to	  
display	  their	  logos	  in	  front	  of	  the	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  that	  watch	  their	  sports	  on	  
television.	  
In	  the	  1986	  case	  of	  Graczyk	  v.	  Workers'	  Comp.	  Appeals	  Bd.,	  the	  Court	  of	  
Appeals	  of	  California	  upheld	  the	  decisions	  made	  three	  years	  prior	  and	  denied	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compensation	  for	  injury	  based	  on	  the	  NCAA’s	  framing	  of	  amateurism	  and	  athletic	  
scholarships	  as	  fulfilling	  a	  non-­‐employment	  status.	  The	  courts	  used	  a	  four-­‐factor	  
approach	  to	  determining	  this	  status.	  First,	  they	  were	  concerned	  with	  whether	  or	  not	  
the	  alleged	  employer	  controls	  the	  details	  of	  the	  alleged	  employee’s	  work.	  Because	  
the	  coaches,	  a	  college	  employee,	  dictate	  a	  rigorous	  workout	  and	  dietary	  schedule	  for	  
their	  athletes,	  the	  university	  exercises	  extensive	  control	  over	  the	  details	  of	  athletes’	  
work	  and	  this	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  Second,	  the	  
court	  looked	  at	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  alleged	  employer	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  fire	  alleged	  
employees	  and	  determined	  that	  the	  university	  has	  no	  right	  to	  dismiss,	  which	  they	  
held	  to	  mean	  expel,	  the	  student-­‐athlete	  for	  poor	  performance	  on	  the	  athletic	  field.	  
Thirdly,	  the	  court	  analyzed	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  alleged	  employee	  is	  paid	  and	  
determined	  that	  a	  free	  education,	  room,	  and	  board	  was	  a	  gift	  not	  dissimilar	  from	  
academic	  or	  other	  talent-­‐based	  scholarships,	  thus	  not	  constituting	  payment,	  a	  
concept	  that	  will	  also	  be	  revisited	  later	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Lastly,	  the	  court	  looked	  at	  
whether	  or	  not	  the	  alleged	  employer	  furnishes	  the	  equipment	  for	  the	  job,	  which	  the	  
universities	  do	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  talent	  and	  labor,	  which	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  
athletes	  (Schott,	  4-­‐5).	  Based	  on	  these	  criteria,	  the	  court	  continued	  to	  allow	  the	  NCAA	  
to	  function	  as	  it	  had	  previously,	  allowing	  further	  growth	  without	  compensation	  for	  
the	  athletes.	  	  
This	  type	  of	  dual	  operation	  by	  the	  NCAA,	  both	  controlling	  all	  the	  “companies”	  
that	  are	  crafting	  individual	  student-­‐athletes	  and	  managing	  the	  “production	  details,	  
promotion,	  and	  sale”	  of	  this	  product,	  has	  been	  called	  cartel	  behavior	  (Epstein,	  373).	  
The	  NCAA	  members	  have	  agreed	  to	  limit	  the	  amount	  of	  compensation	  to	  its	  student	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athletes	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  attending	  each	  respective	  university.	  By	  controlling	  inputs	  
and	  lowering	  costs	  through	  the	  promotion	  of	  amateurism,	  limiting	  recruiting	  and	  
numbers	  of	  athletes,	  the	  NCAA	  is	  controlling	  an	  entire	  business.	  When	  combined	  
with	  the	  courts’	  willingness	  to	  permit	  the	  Association	  to	  make	  its	  own	  rules,	  this	  
allows	  it	  to	  operate	  in	  a	  zone	  that	  is	  legally	  defined	  by	  them	  and	  governed	  by	  the	  
philosophy	  amateurism	  (Mitten	  et	  al.,	  213-­‐4).	  That	  philosophy,	  which	  was	  created	  a	  
century	  before	  the	  Sherman	  Anti-­‐Trust	  Act	  banned	  cartels,	  is	  actually	  nonexistent	  in	  
the	  current	  practice	  of	  this	  cartel	  organization.	  Only	  in	  the	  case	  of	  promotion	  was	  
the	  NCAA	  convicted	  of	  violating	  Anti-­‐Trust	  legislation,	  and	  that	  was	  in	  a	  case	  when	  it	  
restricted	  itself.	  In	  1988	  the	  United	  States	  5th	  Circuit	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  finalized	  the	  
status	  of	  grants-­‐in-­‐aid	  and	  other	  compensation	  in	  McCormack	  v.	  NCAA.	  Cheerleaders	  
and	  football	  players	  from	  Southern	  Methodist	  University	  brought	  forth	  this	  class-­‐
action	  lawsuit	  following	  the	  NCAA	  suspending	  their	  football	  program	  for	  
compensating	  their	  athletes	  beyond	  the	  cost	  of	  room	  and	  board.	  The	  court	  referred	  
to	  NCAA	  v.	  Regents	  when	  stating,	  “most	  of	  the	  regulatory	  controls	  of	  the	  NCAA	  are	  a	  
justifiable	  means	  of	  fostering	  competition	  among	  amateur	  athletic	  competition	  and	  
therefore	  are	  procompetitive	  because	  they	  enhance	  interest	  in	  intercollegiate	  
athletics”	  (McCormack	  v.	  NCAA).	  The	  court	  went	  on	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  although	  
true	  amateurism	  is	  not	  achieved	  in	  collegiate	  sports,	  the	  attempts	  that	  the	  
Association	  is	  making	  toward	  creating	  a	  practical	  mixture	  justify	  compensating	  the	  
athletes	  for	  their	  education	  cost.	  The	  final	  decision	  rejected	  the	  claim	  that	  restrictive	  
payments	  in	  the	  NCAA	  constitute	  price	  fixing.	  Once	  again,	  courts	  have	  ruled	  that	  the	  
NCAA’s	  goals	  of	  preserving	  an	  imperfect	  model	  of	  amateurism	  justify	  its	  violation	  of	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established	  legislature	  governing	  both	  employment	  and	  cartel	  behavior	  (Schott,	  6).	  
The	  NCAA	  was	  allowed	  to	  continue	  operating	  a	  cartel	  that	  was	  effectively	  sold	  to	  an	  
eager	  public	  and	  allowed	  to	  grow	  to	  astronomic	  proportions,	  while	  leaning	  on	  
humble	  beginnings.	  
In	  1990,	  the	  United	  States	  District	  Court	  in	  Nashville,	  Tennessee	  revoked	  
Brad	  Gaines’s	  eligibility	  to	  participate	  in	  football	  at	  Vanderbilt	  University	  following	  
his	  unsuccessful	  attempt	  to	  be	  drafted	  into	  the	  National	  Football	  League	  (NFL).	  The	  
eligibility	  rules	  of	  the	  NCAA	  made	  its	  type	  of	  amateurism	  acceptable	  under	  the	  
Sherman	  Anti-­‐Trust	  Act.	  Two	  years	  later,	  the	  7th	  Circuit	  Court	  also	  upheld	  this	  line	  of	  
reasoning	  in	  Banks	  v.	  NCAA	  by	  removing	  Braxton	  Banks’	  eligibility	  to	  participate	  in	  
intercollegiate	  football	  following	  his	  payment	  to	  an	  agent	  and	  entrance	  in	  the	  NFL	  
draft.	  Had	  the	  court	  relied	  only	  on	  the	  typical	  rule-­‐of-­‐reason	  analysis	  for	  
determining	  Sherman	  Anti-­‐trust	  Act	  violations,	  it	  would	  have	  determined	  NCAA’s	  
bylaws	  prohibiting	  agents	  and	  outside	  compensation	  would	  be	  illegal.	  This	  is	  
demonstrated	  by	  its	  statement,	  “the	  NCAA	  and	  its	  member	  institutions	  have	  near	  
total	  control	  of	  the	  market	  of	  college	  players;	  such	  control	  might	  be	  deemed	  more	  
than	  adequate	  market	  share	  to	  constitute	  market	  power”	  (Banks	  v.	  NCAA).	  Since	  
there	  is	  no	  substitution	  for	  college	  sports,	  the	  NCAA	  has	  monopsony	  power	  of	  the	  
market,	  as	  they	  are	  the	  only	  buyer	  of	  high	  school	  graduate	  talent	  facing	  many	  sellers	  
wishing	  to	  showcase	  their	  maturing	  talent	  for	  professional	  leagues.	  Rules	  about	  
compensation	  directly	  regulate	  the	  price	  of	  student-­‐athlete	  services,	  restraining	  
ability	  for	  them	  to	  market	  their	  services	  the	  way	  other	  athletes	  do.	  Without	  a	  
procompetitive	  justification,	  these	  rules	  are	  illegal	  under	  rule	  of	  reason	  test	  (Schott,	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7).	  Instead,	  the	  NCAA’s	  rules	  were	  upheld	  because	  of	  the	  intention	  to	  separate	  
amateur	  and	  professional	  sports	  (Epstein,	  360).	  Amateurism	  has	  been	  increasingly	  
imposing	  restrictions	  on	  student-­‐athletes	  rather	  than	  protecting	  their	  rights.	  Both	  
the	  NCAA	  and	  the	  court	  system	  supported	  their	  role	  as	  a	  restricting	  and	  
coordinating	  body	  rather	  than	  a	  protector	  of	  student-­‐athletes.	  Ironically,	  by	  insisting	  
on	  protecting	  what	  they	  called	  the	  ideals	  of	  amateurism	  and	  student-­‐athletes,	  the	  
NCAA	  was	  able	  to	  suppress	  the	  very	  freedom	  of	  the	  student-­‐athletes.	  	  
As	  costs,	  revenues,	  and	  salaries	  grew,	  however,	  the	  concern	  of	  the	  NCAA	  for	  
the	  well	  being	  of	  its	  athletes	  remained	  dwarfed	  by	  the	  wish	  for	  profits.	  In	  2000	  the	  
Texas	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  upheld	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  1980s	  decisions	  when	  they	  
deemed	  that	  Kent	  Waldrep,	  a	  football	  player	  permanently	  paralyzed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  an	  
injury	  incurred	  in	  a	  1974	  game	  against	  Alabama,	  was	  not	  entitled	  to	  worker’s	  
compensation,	  as	  there	  was	  no	  employment	  relationship	  determined	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
his	  football	  scholarship	  (Epstein,	  133).	  Once	  again,	  the	  NCAA’s	  commitment	  to	  
protecting	  student-­‐athletes	  from	  extraordinary	  injury	  was	  nowhere	  to	  be	  found,	  
even	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  the	  new	  millennium.	  Because	  athletes	  are	  mandated	  by	  the	  
alleged	  moral	  code	  of	  student	  conduct	  to	  fulfill	  their	  duty	  of	  participation	  at	  the	  risk	  
of	  losing	  their	  scholarship,	  in	  addition	  to	  being	  restricted	  by	  the	  NCAA’s	  embargo	  on	  
outside	  compensation	  for	  their	  talent,	  they	  continue	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  the	  status	  of	  
amateurism,	  without	  gaining	  any	  security	  from	  it.	  
The	  Supreme	  Court	  delivered	  another	  blow	  to	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  student-­‐
athletes	  in	  1988	  in	  the	  case	  of	  NCAA	  v.	  Tarkanian.	  Jerry	  Tarkanian	  was	  a	  coach	  at	  the	  
University	  of	  Nevada	  Las	  Vegas	  (UNLV)	  who	  had	  been	  suspended	  from	  his	  position	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based	  on	  accusations	  of	  violating	  NCAA	  regulations.	  The	  coach	  sued,	  claiming	  that	  
the	  NCAA	  did	  not	  offer	  him	  due	  process	  as	  a	  state	  actor	  and	  got	  reinstated	  based	  on	  
an	  injunction	  issued	  by	  the	  Clark	  County	  District	  Court	  in	  Nevada.	  The	  Supreme	  
Court,	  on	  a	  decision	  by	  the	  same	  Justice	  John	  Paul	  Stevens,	  reversed	  the	  lower	  
court’s	  decision	  based	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  issue	  in	  the	  case	  was	  “whether	  UNLV’s	  
actions	  in	  compliance	  with	  the	  NCAA	  rules	  and	  recommendations	  turned	  the	  NCAA’s	  
actions	  into	  state	  action”	  (NCAA	  v.	  Tarkanian).	  He	  argued	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  
NCAA	  could	  not	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  state	  of	  Nevada	  and	  that	  although	  UNLV	  had	  
followed	  the	  NCAA’s	  rules	  and	  adopted	  its	  recommendation,	  only	  UNLV	  was	  
authorized	  to	  suspend	  Tarkanian.	  Of	  course,	  given	  the	  level	  of	  publicity	  around	  
college	  athletics,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  ludicrous	  for	  UNLV	  to	  reject	  the	  NCAA’s	  
recommendation	  and	  risk	  both	  bad	  press	  and	  a	  large	  penalty	  from	  the	  Association.	  
Once	  again	  Justice	  White	  dissented,	  noting	  “it	  was	  the	  NCAA’s	  finding	  that	  Tarkanian	  
had	  violated	  NCAA	  rules,	  made	  at	  NCAA-­‐conducted	  hearings,	  all	  of	  which	  were	  
agreed	  to	  by	  UNLV	  in	  its	  membership	  agreement	  with	  the	  NCAA,	  that	  resulted	  in	  
Trakanina’s	  suspension”	  (NCAA	  v.	  Tarkanian).	  He	  is	  claiming	  that	  private	  
organizations	  like	  the	  NCAA	  can	  be	  considered	  state	  actors	  if	  they	  engage	  jointly	  
with	  state	  officials	  in	  the	  challenged	  action.	  Justice	  White	  excelled	  at	  football	  at	  both	  
the	  collegiate	  and	  professional	  level	  as	  he	  used	  his	  talents	  in	  order	  to	  pay	  for	  his	  
schooling,	  seeking	  a	  career	  in	  law,	  not	  in	  athletics.	  He	  also	  has	  an	  extreme	  dislike	  of	  
the	  media	  and	  the	  commercialism	  surrounding	  college	  athletics	  as	  well	  as	  a	  mission	  
to	  eliminate	  professionalism	  from	  college	  sports	  (Porto,	  54).	  Unfortunately,	  he	  did	  
not	  have	  the	  backing	  of	  the	  other	  Justices.	  Since	  this	  decision	  deemed	  the	  NCAA’s	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rule-­‐enforcement	  procedures	  exempt	  from	  due	  process	  requirements,	  it	  meant	  that	  
there	  was	  no	  incentive	  for	  the	  organization	  to	  increase	  protections	  to	  its	  staff	  
members	  or,	  more	  importantly,	  its	  athletes.	  Tarkanian	  is	  another	  case	  in	  which	  
courts	  afforded	  more	  rights	  to	  the	  NCAA	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  protections	  for	  the	  student-­‐
athletes	  as	  the	  NCAA	  governs	  both	  the	  Committee	  on	  Infractions	  and	  investigative	  
staff	  that	  assists	  the	  committee.	  This	  decision	  proclaimed	  the	  NCAA	  to	  be	  the	  
“prosecutor,	  judge,	  and	  jury	  all	  the	  same	  in	  those	  proceedings”	  (Porto,	  13).	  	  
Furthermore,	  these	  proceedings	  are	  isolated	  because	  only	  NCAA	  staff	  
members	  are	  allowed	  to	  take	  part	  in	  investigative	  actions	  against	  accused	  coaches	  
and	  athletes.	  To	  exemplify	  the	  potential	  damage	  that	  this	  could	  have	  on	  the	  integrity	  
of	  these	  proceedings	  we	  can	  take	  the	  case	  of	  Dr.	  Ridpath,	  who	  was	  hired	  at	  Marshall	  
University	  as	  the	  assistant	  athletic	  director	  with	  the	  specific	  instruction	  to	  rid	  the	  
program	  of	  suspected	  infractions.	  An	  investigation	  was	  launched	  after	  he	  reported	  
to	  both	  the	  Mid-­‐American	  Conference	  and	  the	  NCAA	  that	  there	  was	  a	  previously	  
unknown	  employment	  scheme	  within	  the	  football	  and	  basketball	  programs.	  This	  
involved	  various	  sinecure	  jobs	  being	  held	  by	  players	  within	  the	  athletic	  department,	  
as	  they	  were	  receiving	  a	  paycheck	  every	  two	  weeks	  without	  doing	  any	  labor.	  In	  
order	  to	  better	  focus	  on	  these	  issues	  and	  for	  various	  personal	  reasons,	  Dr.	  Ridpath	  
changed	  his	  position	  to	  Director	  of	  Judicial	  Programs	  at	  Marshall	  during	  this	  time,	  a	  
position	  outside	  of	  the	  payroll	  of	  the	  athletic	  department.	  The	  President	  of	  the	  
University,	  however,	  made	  the	  claim	  that	  this	  was	  a	  demotion	  based	  on	  his	  recent	  
involvement	  in	  this	  scheme,	  which	  actually	  predated	  his	  time	  at	  the	  university	  by	  7	  
years	  according	  to	  the	  separate	  investigation	  done	  by	  Ridpath’s	  lawyers.	  It	  would	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have	  been	  absurd	  for	  the	  new	  athletic	  director	  to	  incite	  an	  NCAA	  investigation	  into	  a	  
matter	  in	  which	  he	  was	  involved.	  The	  Committee	  of	  Investigation	  found	  Dr.	  Ridpath	  
to	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  violations	  and	  recommended	  his	  termination	  in	  2009.	  For	  
convenience,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  fines,	  the	  University	  cleverly	  maneuvered	  the	  
internal	  investigation,	  which	  had	  to	  exclude	  all	  persons	  outside	  of	  the	  athletic	  
department,	  to	  frame	  Dr.	  Ridpath	  as	  a	  scapegoat,	  ruining	  his	  career	  and	  reputation,	  
while	  the	  real	  culprits	  were	  still	  holding	  jobs	  within	  intercollegiate	  athletics	  (Porto,	  
163-­‐5).	  Thus,	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Regents,	  Tarkanian	  and	  all	  of	  the	  lower	  court	  
decision,	  the	  NCAA	  as	  well	  as	  individual	  colleges	  and	  universities	  have	  learned	  to	  
take	  advantage	  of	  the	  court’s	  willingness	  to	  disregard	  individuals	  within	  college	  
sports	  in	  favor	  of	  its	  commercial	  prowess,	  ensuring	  that	  collegiate	  sports	  take	  
further	  strides	  toward	  an	  outright	  monopoly	  on	  state-­‐subsidized,	  tax-­‐exempt	  
professional	  sports	  that	  do	  not	  have	  to	  pay	  their	  athletes	  because	  of	  its	  monopsony	  
power	  on	  the	  market	  of	  young	  athletes	  fresh	  out	  of	  high	  school.	  The	  most	  successful	  
outright	  cartel	  has	  built	  an	  intricate	  web	  of	  bylaws	  and	  careful	  provisions	  in	  order	  to	  
gain	  the	  legal	  cover	  to	  profit	  greatly	  from	  the	  unfortunate	  young	  athletes	  who	  are	  
being	  manipulated	  and	  held	  with	  no	  choice	  and	  no	  protection	  under	  the	  false	  
pretenses	  of	  higher	  education	  and	  the	  absurd	  premise	  of	  protection	  from	  injury.	  	  
	  
3.	  A	  Labor	  Approach	  to	  Redemption	  of	  Rights	  
With	  all	  of	  the	  court	  decisions	  upholding	  the	  NCAA’s	  “commitment	  to	  
amateurism”	  as	  being	  enough	  for	  the	  Association	  to	  impose	  restrictions	  on	  student-­‐
athletes’	  rights,	  it	  seems	  almost	  impossible	  for	  athletes	  to	  gain	  any	  form	  of	  sympathy	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that	  would	  lead	  to	  real	  compensation	  for	  their	  athletic	  services.	  However,	  a	  number	  
of	  scholars	  seem	  to	  lean	  toward	  an	  avenue	  of	  argument	  that	  has	  not	  been	  readily	  
utilized	  by	  student-­‐athletes:	  The	  National	  Labor	  Relations	  Act	  (NLRA).	  Many	  of	  the	  
lawsuits	  described	  in	  the	  legal	  section	  of	  this	  paper	  as	  leading	  to	  institutional	  
restrictions	  on	  student-­‐athletes	  deal	  with	  the	  Sherman	  Anti-­‐Trust,	  which	  suggests	  
that	  the	  courts	  have	  generally	  looked	  at	  the	  NCAA	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  member	  
universities	  or	  as	  a	  body	  governing	  the	  relations	  among	  member	  universities.	  
Courts	  have	  not	  looked	  at	  the	  relationship	  that	  athletes	  have	  with	  their	  universities	  
and	  how	  the	  NCAA	  often	  governs	  that	  relationship	  without	  reference	  to	  the	  greater	  
interstate	  commerce	  implications	  of	  intercollegiate	  sports.	  The	  NLRA’s	  purpose	  is	  to	  
regulate	  the	  inherent	  conflict	  between	  capital	  and	  labor	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  NCAA	  and	  its	  members,	  this	  conflict	  is	  manifested	  by	  the	  contradictory	  
notion	  of	  commercialized	  amateur	  college	  sports,	  which	  generate	  revenue	  from	  
labor	  without	  compensation	  for	  those	  providing	  the	  latter.	  Although	  the	  Act	  only	  
governs	  private	  enterprises	  and	  would	  not	  directly	  apply	  to	  public	  universities,	  at	  
least	  32	  states	  have	  statutes	  governing	  employment	  relationships	  among	  public	  
entities	  that	  are	  modeled	  directly	  after	  the	  NLRA,	  thus	  making	  this	  Act	  the	  starting	  
and	  ending	  point	  of	  inquiry	  about	  the	  student-­‐athlete’s	  status	  as	  an	  employee-­‐
athlete	  (McCormick,	  88).	  
In	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  relationship	  between	  independent	  contractors	  and	  
employees,	  The	  National	  Labor	  Relations	  Board	  adopted	  the	  common	  law	  approach	  
or	  right-­‐of-­‐control	  test	  to	  decide	  between	  the	  two	  statuses.	  Under	  this	  test,	  the	  
governing	  factor	  for	  determining	  employee	  status	  is	  the	  degree	  of	  control	  that	  an	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employer	  has	  over	  the	  alleged	  employee,	  as	  far	  as	  both	  the	  end	  result	  and	  the	  
manner	  of	  achieving	  it.	  This	  means	  that	  an	  employer	  controls	  the	  daily	  lives	  and	  the	  
manner	  in	  which	  its	  employees	  carry	  out	  their	  work.	  A	  number	  of	  cases,	  however	  
have	  used	  an	  additional	  criterion	  for	  determining	  an	  employee’s	  status—the	  alleged	  
employee’s	  economic	  dependence	  upon	  the	  employer.	  Several	  of	  the	  cases	  looking	  
at	  the	  employment	  status	  of	  college	  students	  brought	  before	  the	  Board	  have	  been	  
decided	  using	  both	  the	  right	  of	  control	  test	  and	  this	  statutory	  test.	  	  
Under	  the	  Board’s	  two	  methods	  of	  interpretation	  of	  the	  NLRA,	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  
athletes	  in	  the	  revenue	  generating	  sports	  of	  Division	  I	  are	  legal	  employees.	  Under	  
the	  common	  law	  interpretation,	  these	  athletes	  are	  providing	  a	  service	  to	  their	  
universities	  under	  a	  contract	  that	  sets	  forth	  responsibilities	  and	  compensates	  them,	  
are	  subject	  to	  daily	  pervasive	  control	  by	  their	  coaches,	  and	  are	  economically	  
dependent	  upon	  their	  schools.	  The	  degree	  of	  control	  that	  universities	  have	  over	  
their	  “employee-­‐athletes,”	  as	  they	  are	  described	  by	  McCormick,	  has	  been	  assessed	  
by	  numerous	  studies	  and	  interviews,	  often	  concluding	  that	  they	  are	  subject	  to	  more	  
control	  than	  any	  other	  employee	  group,	  as	  no	  other	  employee	  is	  required	  to	  lift	  
weights	  or	  a	  similar	  strenuous	  physical	  activity	  at	  5:30	  AM	  or	  seek	  permission	  to	  
leave	  campus	  during	  the	  summer	  off	  hours	  at	  risk	  of	  termination.	  An	  average	  
football	  player	  will,	  in	  fact,	  spend	  fourteen	  weeks	  in	  season	  participating	  in	  a	  
“conservative	  estimate	  of	  approximately	  fifty-­‐three	  hours”	  of	  mandatory	  football	  
activities	  including	  practice,	  film	  sessions,	  and	  meetings	  (McCormick,	  99).	  Clearly	  
that	  is	  more	  than	  a	  full-­‐time	  position	  for	  university	  employment.	  In	  most	  cases	  this	  
means	  that	  football	  players	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  take	  afternoon	  classes	  so	  that	  they	  do	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not	  conflict	  with	  practice	  schedules,	  yet	  are	  required	  by	  the	  NCAA	  to	  “be	  enrolled	  in	  
at	  least	  a	  minimum	  full-­‐time	  program	  of	  studies	  leading	  to	  a	  baccalaureate	  or	  
equivalent	  degree,	  which	  shall	  not	  be	  less	  than	  12	  semester	  hours”	  (Ncaa.org,	  Div.	  I	  
Manual,	  art	  14.1.8.2).	  Not	  only	  does	  this	  show	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  control	  by	  the	  
employer,	  but	  also	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  relationship	  that	  the	  University	  has	  
with	  these	  students	  is	  primarily	  economic	  and	  not	  educational,	  especially	  since	  they	  
are	  sometimes	  foreclosed	  from	  certain	  classes	  and	  even	  majors.	  Furthermore,	  the	  
degree	  of	  control	  is	  so	  great	  that	  these	  athletes	  are	  required	  by	  risk	  of	  termination	  
to	  attend	  every	  class	  and	  sit	  as	  close	  as	  possible	  to	  the	  front	  of	  the	  classroom,	  while	  
being	  monitored	  by	  persons	  that	  report	  to	  the	  athletic	  department.	  	  
During	  the	  off-­‐season,	  players	  undergo	  rigorous	  conditioning	  including	  
weightlifting	  three	  to	  four	  days	  per	  week	  for	  at	  least	  one	  or	  two	  hours,	  hour-­‐long	  
team	  meetings	  every	  weekday	  in	  addition	  to	  practice,	  their	  lives	  being	  essentially	  
regulated	  from	  5:30	  AM	  to	  10:00	  PM.	  During	  the	  summer,	  these	  players	  must	  make	  
up	  any	  required	  classes	  they	  had	  to	  miss	  due	  to	  in-­‐season	  requirements,	  but	  they	  
cannot	  do	  so	  in	  the	  second	  term	  of	  the	  summer	  because	  of	  pre-­‐season	  training,	  
which	  begins	  in	  the	  first	  week	  of	  August	  (McCormick,	  101-­‐2).	  The	  level	  of	  
accountability	  that	  is	  expected	  of	  these	  athletes	  is	  indicative	  of	  employee	  status,	  as	  
attendance	  to	  all	  scheduled	  events	  is	  mandatory	  and	  recorded,	  much	  like	  other	  
employees	  are	  required	  to	  clock	  their	  hours.	  Given	  these	  facts,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  
point	  that	  universities	  dictate	  mandatory	  demands	  of	  their	  players	  for	  240	  days	  of	  
the	  year	  during	  a	  season	  in	  which	  the	  team	  does	  not	  qualify	  for	  a	  post-­‐season	  bowl	  
championship	  and	  262	  days	  during	  bowl	  championship	  years,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  time	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commitment	  approximates	  or	  exceeds	  the	  250	  days	  per	  year	  that	  the	  average	  
American	  spends	  on	  the	  clock.	  These	  athletes	  are	  additionally	  prohibited	  from	  using	  
tobacco	  or	  alcohol	  at	  many	  of	  these	  institutions’	  football	  programs,	  something	  that	  
is	  not	  prohibited	  by	  any	  other	  employer	  (Moore,	  63).	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  football	  
programs	  at	  the	  Division	  I	  level	  put	  a	  level	  of	  control	  that	  exceeds	  the	  national	  
average,	  not	  minimum,	  numbers	  for	  time	  demanded	  of	  employees	  by	  their	  
employers,	  exhibiting	  a	  level	  of	  control	  that	  must	  fulfill	  the	  first	  criterion	  for	  
defining	  employment	  under	  the	  NLRA.	  
Universities	  have	  the	  same	  pervasive	  control	  over	  their	  basketball	  athletes.	  
Unlike	  amateur	  athletes,	  these	  players	  spend	  four	  to	  five	  hours	  per	  day,	  six	  days	  per	  
week	  practicing	  or	  watching	  film	  in	  addition	  to	  playing	  one	  or	  two	  games	  each	  week,	  
sometimes	  going	  on	  road	  trips	  that	  can	  be	  as	  long	  as	  10	  hours	  each	  way,	  often	  in	  the	  
middle	  of	  the	  week.	  One	  of	  the	  students	  McCormick	  interviewed	  stated	  that	  “it	  is	  
impossible	  not	  to	  miss	  class,”	  while	  another	  estimated	  that	  he	  missed	  fifteen	  to	  
twenty	  percent	  of	  his	  classes	  (107).	  Since	  television	  stations	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  
scheduling,	  games	  can	  happen	  at	  any	  time	  between	  10	  a.m.	  and	  midnight,	  something	  
that	  makes	  it	  impossible	  for	  players	  to	  adequately	  follow	  a	  study	  plan	  (Duderstadt,	  
65).	  Even	  during	  the	  off-­‐season,	  players	  must	  devote	  a	  minimum	  of	  three	  hours	  each	  
day	  of	  the	  week	  to	  practice	  in	  addition	  to	  mandatory	  study	  halls	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  
offset	  the	  academic	  time	  they	  lost	  during	  the	  season.	  Basketball	  coaches	  also	  have	  
the	  same	  restrictions	  on	  the	  social	  lives	  of	  players	  as	  their	  football	  counterparts.	  “No	  
other	  university	  employee	  is	  even	  remotely	  subject	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  control,	  day	  by	  
day,	  hour	  by	  hour,	  minute	  by	  minute,	  as	  the	  employee-­‐athlete”	  (McCormick,	  108).	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This	  confirms	  the	  fact	  that	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  Division	  I	  basketball	  players	  are	  employees	  
under	  the	  NLRA’s	  first	  criterion.	  
Although	  many	  courts	  in	  the	  United	  States	  have	  deemed	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  
scholarships	  to	  be	  framed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  not	  be	  considered	  compensation	  for	  
athletic	  participation,	  their	  true	  purpose	  has	  been	  adequately	  outlined	  above.	  These	  
scholarships	  constitute	  a	  payment	  for	  the	  athletic	  services	  rendered,	  fulfilling	  the	  
second	  criterion	  of	  the	  NLRA.	  Article	  15.1	  of	  the	  Division	  I	  NCAA	  manual	  states	  that	  
scholarships	  may	  be	  awarded	  based	  solely	  on	  athletic	  ability,	  irrespective	  of	  
academic	  promise	  or	  financial	  need,	  and	  the	  NCAA	  maintains	  the	  right	  to	  veto	  how	  
many	  each	  school	  can	  afford,	  how	  much	  they	  can	  cover,	  and	  who	  can	  receive	  them.	  
Many	  of	  the	  Division	  I	  athletes	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  pay	  for	  school	  without	  these	  
scholarships.	  Because	  of	  the	  time	  and	  energy	  demands	  of	  these	  athletes,	  it	  is	  almost	  
impossible	  for	  them	  to	  hold	  a	  side	  job	  while	  maintaining	  their	  full	  academic	  load.	  
Athletes	  were	  even	  prohibited	  by	  the	  Association	  from	  holding	  such	  jobs	  until	  1998	  
(Freedman,	  680).	  When	  adding	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  scholarships	  pay	  for	  food	  and	  
shelter,	  the	  final	  criterion	  for	  the	  common	  law	  test	  is	  confirmed,	  as	  these	  athletes	  
are	  financially	  dependent	  on	  their	  universities.	  Thus,	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  football	  and	  
basketball	  players	  at	  the	  Division	  IA	  level	  are	  employees	  under	  the	  NLRA’s	  common	  
law	  test.	  
In	  cases	  where	  the	  National	  Labor	  Relations	  Board	  has	  determined	  the	  status	  
of	  students,	  they	  have	  employed	  the	  statutory	  test	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  common	  law	  
test.	  In	  its	  1974	  Leland	  Stanford	  Junior	  University	  decision,	  the	  Board	  looked	  at	  four	  
criteria	  to	  determine	  that	  graduate	  research	  assistants	  were	  not	  employees	  under	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the	  NLRA.	  The	  Board	  decided	  that	  because	  (1)	  these	  persons	  were	  graduate	  
students	  enrolled	  in	  pursuit	  of	  a	  PhD	  in	  physics	  at	  Stanford,	  (2)	  they	  were	  required	  
to	  perform	  research	  to	  acquire	  a	  degree,	  (3)	  they	  received	  academic	  credit	  for	  their	  
research,	  and	  (4)	  their	  stipend	  from	  the	  university	  was	  not	  dependent	  upon	  the	  
nature	  or	  value	  of	  their	  services	  (Leland	  Stanford	  Junior	  University).	  The	  Board	  
determined	  that	  because	  these	  persons	  were	  primarily	  students,	  they	  were	  not	  
employees.	  Three	  years	  later,	  the	  board	  upheld	  its	  decision	  in	  a	  similar	  case,	  St.	  
Clair’s	  Hospital,	  regarding	  student-­‐like	  employees,	  arguing	  that	  “the	  mutual	  interest	  
of	  the	  students	  and	  the	  educational	  institution	  in	  the	  services	  being	  rendered	  are	  
predominantly	  academic	  rather	  than	  economic	  in	  nature”	  (St.	  Claire	  Hospital).	  By	  
1999,	  however,	  the	  Board	  had	  changed	  its	  interpretation	  in	  the	  case	  of	  New	  York	  
University,	  arguing	  that	  the	  common	  law	  approach	  deems	  these	  student	  research	  
assistants	  to	  be	  employees	  because	  of	  the	  inherent	  master-­‐servant	  relationship	  
expressed	  by	  the	  employer’s	  right	  to	  control	  the	  actions	  of	  its	  employees	  in	  return	  
for	  payment.	  This	  decision	  was	  overturned	  by	  the	  Brown	  University	  case	  finding	  
which	  was	  based	  on	  facts	  fitting	  into	  four	  categories	  “[(1)]	  the	  status	  of	  graduate	  
student	  assistants	  as	  students,	  [(2)]	  the	  role	  of	  graduate	  student	  assistantships	  in	  
graduate	  education,	  [(3)]	  the	  graduate	  student	  assistants’	  relationship	  with	  the	  
faculty,	  and	  [(4)]	  the	  financial	  support	  they	  receive	  to	  attend	  Brown”	  (Brown	  
University).	  The	  non-­‐employee	  relationship	  under	  the	  NLRA	  was	  determined	  based	  
on	  whether	  the	  relationship	  was	  primarily	  educational	  and	  not	  economic	  in	  nature.	  
However,	  this	  allows	  a	  student	  to	  be	  considered	  an	  employee	  under	  the	  Act	  if	  he	  or	  
she	  fulfills	  the	  common	  law	  test	  and	  performs	  services	  for	  its	  university	  in	  a	  manner	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that	  is	  not	  academic	  in	  nature,	  while	  his	  or	  her	  relationship	  to	  the	  university	  with	  
respect	  to	  those	  services	  is	  economic	  in	  nature	  (McCormick,	  96).	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  Board	  did	  not	  decide	  in	  Brown	  that	  graduate	  
assistants	  are	  not	  employees	  because	  of	  their	  status	  as	  students.	  Otherwise	  there	  
would	  have	  been	  no	  need	  for	  a	  second,	  third,	  and	  fourth	  criterion.	  Rather,	  the	  board	  
ruled	  that	  the	  graduate	  assistants	  were	  “primarily	  students,”	  something	  that	  the	  
NCAA	  claims	  about	  their	  athletes	  (Brown	  University).	  The	  student-­‐status	  is,	  
nonetheless,	  only	  a	  formality	  necessary	  for	  the	  NCAA	  to	  continue	  claiming	  its	  
dedication	  to	  amateurism.	  The	  athletic	  services	  rendered	  by	  these	  individuals	  are	  
not	  related	  to	  their	  educational	  programs	  and	  are,	  in	  fact,	  a	  hindrance	  to	  their	  
academic	  development.	  In	  Brown,	  the	  graduates	  were	  spending	  only	  a	  few	  hours	  
each	  week	  working	  as	  lab	  assistants	  and	  “it	  is	  beyond	  dispute	  that	  their	  principal	  
time	  commitment	  at	  Brown	  is	  focused	  on	  obtaining	  a	  degree	  and,	  thus,	  [on]	  being	  a	  
student”	  (Brown	  University).	  Student-­‐athletes	  spend	  up	  to	  fifty-­‐three	  hours	  each	  
week	  on	  their	  athletic	  participation,	  likely	  sleep	  a	  minimum	  of	  eight	  hours	  a	  day	  in	  
order	  to	  allow	  their	  bodies	  to	  recover	  from	  their	  strenuous	  training,	  and	  another	  2	  
hours	  per	  day	  eating,	  leaving	  forty-­‐five	  hours	  to	  do	  anything	  else.	  Even	  if	  they	  had	  
no	  social	  life,	  no	  media	  attention,	  and	  no	  hobbies,	  they	  would	  be	  devoting	  less	  time	  
to	  studying	  than	  to	  athletics.	  The	  commercial	  aspect	  of	  the	  league	  also	  indicates	  the	  
true	  intentions	  that	  the	  universities	  and	  the	  Association	  have	  for	  these	  young	  men:	  
labor.	  Furthermore,	  if	  their	  main	  purpose	  were	  pursuing	  a	  degree,	  their	  graduation	  
rates	  would	  be	  higher.	  University	  of	  Central	  Florida	  published	  a	  study	  showing	  
“nearly	  half	  of	  the	  college	  [football]	  teams	  that	  participated	  in	  bowl	  games	  at	  the	  end	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of	  the	  2005	  season	  had	  failed	  to	  graduate	  at	  least	  50	  percent	  of	  their	  players	  during	  
the	  past	  6	  years”	  (Porto,	  8).	  That	  same	  year,	  of	  the	  65	  teams	  that	  made	  the	  NCAA	  
basketball	  tournament,	  35	  did	  reach	  the	  50	  percent	  mark.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  
that	  because	  professional	  leagues	  often	  recruit	  these	  athletes	  before	  they	  graduate	  
from	  college,	  their	  graduation	  rates	  would	  naturally	  be	  slightly	  lower.	  However,	  only	  
around	  three	  basketball	  undergraduates	  and	  ten	  football	  undergraduates	  are	  
selected	  to	  join	  professional	  leagues	  each	  year,	  meaning	  that	  the	  graduation	  rates	  
presented	  are	  virtually	  unaffected	  by	  these	  few	  individuals.	  The	  fact	  that	  
professionals	  recruit	  them	  in	  the	  first	  place	  further	  indicates	  that	  their	  commitment	  
is	  primarily	  economic,	  not	  academic	  (Mitten	  et	  al.,	  223).	  	  The	  sad	  truth	  about	  college	  
amateurism	  is	  that	  these	  are	  professionals	  enrolled	  at	  their	  universities	  primarily	  as	  
athletes,	  something	  that	  the	  National	  Labor	  Relations	  Board	  could	  not	  deny	  under	  
its	  previous	  jurisprudence.	  
The	  second	  condition	  in	  the	  Brown	  statutory	  test	  looked	  at	  the	  degree	  to	  
which	  the	  work	  performed	  by	  the	  students	  furthered	  their	  education	  and	  found	  that	  
their	  services	  in	  teaching	  and	  research	  were	  directly	  linked	  to	  their	  coursework.	  
Contrarily,	  the	  work	  performed	  by	  the	  students	  is	  utterly	  unrelated	  to	  their	  
education	  or	  degrees.	  Participation	  in	  sports	  is	  not	  required	  for	  any	  course	  or	  for	  the	  
completion	  of	  any	  degree	  and,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  revenue	  these	  sports	  
generate,	  they	  are	  entirely	  economic	  in	  nature.	  Additionally,	  the	  university’s’	  clear	  
commercial	  nature	  indicates	  that	  they	  have	  a	  powerful	  incentive	  to	  focus	  on	  athletic	  
rather	  than	  academic	  success	  in	  the	  case	  of	  these	  individuals.	  This	  fact,	  combined	  
with	  the	  academic	  standards	  put	  in	  place	  simply	  to	  maintain	  appearances,	  serves	  to	  
Vlad	  A.	  Bursuc	   	   Politics	  Honors	  Thesis	  
	   43	  
further	  highlight	  the	  economic	  relationship	  and	  the	  intention	  to	  maintain	  good	  
public	  relations,	  revealing	  the	  “fundamentally	  commercial	  nature”	  of	  college	  sports	  
(McCormick,	  135).	  The	  third	  criterion	  was	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  that	  the	  
students	  had	  with	  their	  faculty	  as	  they	  were	  supervised	  and	  instructed	  during	  their	  
jobs	  by	  the	  same	  people	  that	  taught	  their	  classes,	  which	  meant	  that	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  
the	  Board,	  they	  were	  still	  being	  instructed	  as	  students.	  Since	  coaches,	  who	  are	  not	  
faculty,	  supervise	  athletes	  during	  their	  practice,	  their	  work	  as	  athletes	  is	  not	  
educational	  in	  nature	  and	  their	  time	  at	  practice	  does	  not	  help	  in	  any	  way	  with	  their	  
academic	  work	  (McCormick,	  125).	  Under	  the	  second	  and	  third	  criteria,	  student-­‐
athletes	  qualify	  as	  employees	  because	  of	  the	  fundamental	  differences	  between	  their	  
job	  and	  that	  of	  the	  graduate	  research	  assistants	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  relevance	  to	  the	  
education	  they	  gain	  from	  the	  university.	  
The	  final	  criterion	  for	  determining	  employment	  is	  whether	  athletic	  
scholarships	  are	  compensation	  for	  athletic	  services	  and	  not	  merely	  financial	  aid.	  In	  
Brown,	  the	  Board	  decided	  that	  the	  graduate	  students’	  scholarship	  was	  mere	  
financial	  aid	  that	  allowed	  them	  to	  attend	  Brown	  and	  were	  unrelated	  to	  the	  quality	  or	  
value	  of	  the	  services	  they	  provided	  in	  the	  lab.	  The	  key	  to	  determining	  whether	  or	  
not	  these	  payments	  constitute	  compensation	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  would	  be	  
withheld	  if	  these	  services	  were	  terminated.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  graduate	  assistants,	  their	  
scholarships	  would	  remain	  so	  long	  as	  they	  maintained	  good	  academic	  standing	  even	  
if	  they	  stopped	  performing	  the	  lab	  assistant	  services.	  The	  situation	  in	  Division	  IA	  is	  
quite	  different	  since	  athletic	  grants-­‐in-­‐aid	  are	  never	  given	  without	  athletic	  services	  
being	  rendered.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  these	  scholarships	  are	  limited	  to	  one	  year	  and	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can	  be	  removed	  if	  the	  player’s	  contribution	  to	  athletics	  is	  not	  deemed	  to	  be	  
appropriate,	  making	  the	  scholarships	  effectively	  dependent	  on	  proper	  athletic	  
participation.	  When	  comparing	  merit-­‐	  or	  need-­‐based	  scholarships	  to	  athletic	  grants-­‐
in-­‐aid	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  latter	  is	  only	  awarded	  based	  on	  services	  rendered	  
and	  often	  covers	  all	  costs,	  while	  the	  former	  rarely	  waives	  all	  costs	  is	  given	  simply	  to	  
enable	  students	  to	  attend	  the	  university	  and	  pursue	  a	  degree	  irrespective	  of	  their	  
extra-­‐curricular	  activities.	  Since	  the	  NCAA	  engages	  in	  cartel	  behavior,	  McCormick	  
argues,	  “this	  anti-­‐competitive	  and	  illegal	  arrangement	  can	  hardly	  serve	  as	  
justification	  that	  athletes	  are	  not	  employees	  any	  more	  than	  a	  wage-­‐fixing	  
arrangement	  among	  employers	  in	  a	  industry	  would	  render	  their	  workers	  as	  non-­‐
employees”	  (129).	  All	  of	  this	  evidence	  unilaterally	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  criteria	  
under	  the	  common	  law	  and	  statutory	  tests	  for	  determining	  employment	  
relationships	  under	  the	  NLRA	  is	  fulfilled	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  relationship	  between	  
universities	  and	  their	  athletes.	  
Division	  I	  football	  and	  basketball	  players,	  although	  often	  not	  entirely	  
students,	  are	  denied	  a	  number	  of	  rights	  by	  their	  current	  legal	  definition,	  while	  
hurting	  the	  academic	  reputation	  of	  their	  colleges	  and	  universities.	  Under	  the	  NLRA	  
the	  employee	  has	  a	  number	  of	  exclusive	  rights:	  “To	  self-­‐organization,	  to	  form,	  join,	  
or	  assist	  labor	  organizations,	  to	  bargain	  collectively	  through	  a	  representative	  of	  
their	  choosing,	  and	  to	  engage	  in	  other	  concerted	  activities	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
collective	  bargaining	  or	  other	  mutual	  aid	  or	  protection”	  (29	  USC	  §	  157).	  The	  
additional	  rights	  that	  these	  students	  are	  entitled	  to	  under	  the	  NLRA	  would	  greatly	  
improve	  their	  financial	  situations,	  allowing	  them	  to	  receive	  more	  money	  that	  they	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ever	  could	  from	  grants-­‐in-­‐aid.	  Collective	  bargaining	  from	  these	  talented	  individuals	  
would	  enable	  them	  to	  better	  provide	  for	  their	  families	  for	  an	  additional	  four	  years	  
instead	  of	  risking	  permanent	  injury	  while	  pretending	  to	  be	  a	  student	  ready	  to	  fail	  at	  
achieving	  a	  degree.	  As	  the	  proportion	  of	  students	  holding	  a	  “special	  admit”	  status	  is	  
dramatically	  higher	  among	  revenue-­‐generating	  athletes	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  
the	  student	  body,	  it	  is	  unclear	  that	  many	  of	  these	  employees	  actually	  deserve	  to	  
have	  a	  spot	  at	  many	  universities,	  contradicting	  the	  universities’	  mission	  of	  
education.	  In	  fact,	  this	  is	  significant	  enough	  that	  schools	  can	  recruit	  from	  high	  
schools	  that	  are	  magnet	  schools	  specifically	  for	  athletes	  and	  have	  even	  changed	  
their	  graduation	  requirements	  for	  athletes.	  They	  have	  instituted	  a	  sliding	  scale	  of	  
grade	  point	  average	  (GPA)	  and	  scores	  on	  The	  Scholastic	  Aptitude	  Test	  (SAT),	  so	  that	  
a	  student	  who	  only	  writes	  his	  name	  correctly	  on	  the	  SAT	  and	  answers	  no	  questions	  
can	  get	  admitted	  to	  college	  if	  he	  has	  a	  GPA	  of	  3.55	  (Should	  NCAA	  Rules…,	  69).	  
Additionally,	  many	  schools	  even	  allow	  fictitious	  classes,	  unlisted	  in	  any	  catalogs	  and	  
available	  only	  to	  athletes,	  to	  allow	  teams	  to	  travel	  for	  extended	  road	  trips,	  like	  
professionals,	  while	  still	  receiving	  as	  many	  as	  six	  hours	  of	  credit	  (Kaburakis,	  299).	  	  
The	  power	  of	  myth	  is	  exceptionally	  apparent,	  as	  it	  has	  served	  the	  economic	  
interest	  of	  universities	  and	  the	  NCAA.	  The	  power	  of	  law,	  however,	  should	  be	  greater	  
in	  a	  society	  that	  prides	  itself	  on	  looking	  beyond	  propaganda	  to	  facts	  and	  truth.	  The	  
truth	  is	  that	  it	  would	  be	  beneficial	  for	  both	  athletes	  and	  universities’	  academic	  
missions	  to	  restructure	  the	  definition	  of	  student-­‐athletes	  toward	  the	  direction	  of	  
employees	  and	  end	  the	  farce	  of	  amateurism.	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4.	  Avenues	  of	  Reform	  
	   With	  collegiate	  football	  and	  basketball	  players	  being	  worth	  on	  average	  
$121,048	  and	  $265,027	  respectively	  per	  year,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  justification	  for	  
reform	  exists	  (Staurowski,	  576).	  Luckily,	  another	  legal	  path	  to	  creating	  effective	  
change	  within	  intercollegiate	  sports	  also	  exists.	  This	  path	  can	  be	  found	  by	  looking	  to	  
a	  significant	  victory	  for	  the	  NCAA.	  Under	  the	  rule-­‐of-­‐reason	  analysis	  employed	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  Banks	  vs.	  NCAA,	  it	  was	  determined	  that	  the	  NCAA	  has	  monopsony	  power	  
over	  its	  market,	  which	  would	  be	  illegal	  without	  a	  procompetitive	  justification,	  which	  
was	  fulfilled	  by	  the	  NCAA’s	  alleged	  commitment	  to	  amateurism,	  according	  to	  the	  7th	  
Circuit	  Court.	  In	  order	  for	  the	  NCAA	  to	  be	  forced	  to	  abandon	  its	  price-­‐fixing	  
practices,	  a	  group	  of	  athletes,	  preferably	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  schools	  and	  conferences,	  
must	  prove	  three	  factors	  in	  court.	  All	  of	  these	  factors	  are	  true	  at	  this	  time	  and	  can	  be	  
proven	  by	  the	  facts,	  which	  have	  been	  presented	  here,	  as	  well	  as	  further	  
overwhelming	  evidence.	  This	  court	  decision	  can	  be	  a	  real	  catalyst	  for	  change,	  which	  
can	  be	  manifested	  in	  various	  forms.	  	  
The	  first	  item	  they	  must	  prove	  is	  that	  the	  ideal	  of	  amateurism	  is	  no	  longer	  
prevalent	  in	  college	  sports	  at	  the	  Division	  IA	  level,	  which	  have	  become	  entirely	  
commercial,	  a	  factor	  that	  has	  been	  extensively	  established	  in	  this	  thesis,	  and	  has	  
even	  been	  admitted	  by	  the	  president	  of	  the	  NCAA	  when	  he	  stated	  that	  it	  is	  the	  
university’s	  “obligation	  to	  generate	  significant	  amounts	  of	  revenue	  to	  their	  [athletic]	  
department’s	  mission.”	  The	  second	  item	  they	  must	  prove	  is	  that	  the	  NCAA’s	  goals	  of	  
promoting	  education	  are,	  in	  fact,	  not	  furthered	  by	  amateurism	  rules.	  While	  this	  
second	  contention	  can	  be	  proven	  by	  the	  gross	  failure	  rates	  of	  recruited	  student-­‐
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athletes	  at	  the	  Division	  IA	  level,	  it	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  NCAA’s	  utter	  
ineffectiveness	  at	  stopping	  recurrent	  scandals	  of	  athletes	  cheating	  at	  various	  
universities	  shows	  that	  the	  level	  of	  competition	  at	  this	  level	  has	  become	  too	  great.	  In	  
fact,	  competitiveness	  is	  so	  great	  that	  their	  push	  for	  whatever	  degree	  of	  amateurism	  
no	  longer	  prevents	  professional-­‐caliber	  athletes	  who	  are	  inadequate	  students	  from	  
being	  sought	  by	  colleges	  for	  their	  athletic	  programs.	  The	  final	  criterion	  for	  
establishing	  a	  court	  decision	  to	  end	  the	  NCAA’s	  cartel	  behavior	  of	  denying	  student-­‐
athletes	  appropriate	  compensation	  lies	  in	  proving	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  less	  restrictive	  
alternative	  for	  promoting	  the	  same	  competitive	  balance.	  Options	  for	  this	  alternative	  
are	  abundant,	  although	  often	  have	  shortcomings.	  
The	  first	  and	  simplest	  alternative	  solution	  is	  the	  intercollegiate	  free-­‐market	  
league.	  In	  this	  system	  the	  universities	  compete	  for	  the	  services	  of	  their	  prospective	  
student-­‐athletes,	  leading	  to	  a	  fair	  price	  for	  each	  individual	  (Johnson).	  This	  system	  
would	  reduce	  the	  cheating	  and	  hypocrisy	  of	  amateurism	  and	  commercialism	  within	  
college	  sports.	  Additionally,	  it	  would	  finally	  align	  these	  athletes	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
United	  States	  population	  engaged	  in	  a	  socially	  sanctioned	  activity	  without	  being	  
denied	  participation	  in	  free-­‐market	  capitalism	  (Yasser,	  133-­‐4).	  The	  drawbacks	  of	  
this	  seemingly	  simple	  solution,	  however,	  include	  many	  of	  the	  academic	  
shortcomings	  of	  the	  current	  system.	  If	  an	  eighteen-­‐year	  old	  athlete	  fails	  to	  perform	  
under	  the	  current	  system	  of	  amateurism,	  he	  loses	  his	  scholarship;	  but	  under	  the	  
free-­‐market	  system,	  he	  can	  be	  fired	  from	  the	  university,	  meaning	  that	  he	  would	  lose	  
his	  student	  position	  as	  well,	  leading	  to	  a	  large	  decrease	  in	  revenue	  for	  the	  NCAA	  due	  
to	  a	  further	  decrease	  in	  academic	  commitment,	  while	  a	  free-­‐market	  system	  of	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athletics	  completely	  divorced	  from	  academics	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  same	  funding	  issue	  
for	  the	  NCAA.	  Therefore,	  this	  alternative	  is	  not	  entirely	  viable	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  
third	  item	  in	  the	  rule-­‐of-­‐reason	  test.	  
Many	  opponents	  of	  paying	  Division	  1	  men’s	  football	  and	  basketball	  athletes	  
will	  also	  point	  to	  Title	  IX	  as	  a	  hindrance.	  This	  educational	  provision	  passed	  in	  1972	  
aims	  to	  protect	  women’s	  rights,	  ensuring	  that	  they	  have	  the	  same	  opportunities	  as	  
their	  male	  counterparts	  in	  education.	  Through	  this	  amendment,	  women	  now	  make	  
up	  fifty	  percent	  or	  more	  of	  graduating	  classes	  at	  institutions	  of	  higher	  education.	  
Title	  IX	  states	  that	  “no	  person	  in	  the	  United	  States	  shall,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sex,	  be	  
excluded	  from	  participation	  in,	  be	  denied	  the	  benefits	  of,	  or	  be	  subjected	  to	  
discrimination	  under	  any	  education	  program	  or	  activity	  receiving	  Federal	  financial	  
assistance.”	  Courts	  have	  interpreted	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  athletics	  this	  means	  that	  
scholarship	  numbers	  must	  be	  proportional	  to	  the	  number	  of	  participants	  in	  sports	  
of	  each	  gender.	  Compliance	  exists	  only	  in	  programs	  that	  are	  equal	  or	  equal	  in	  effect,	  
with	  any	  disparity	  being	  related	  to	  non-­‐discriminatory	  factors.	  This	  jurisprudence	  is	  
flawed	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  First,	  the	  men’s	  sports	  in	  question	  have	  lost	  all	  
educational	  purpose	  as	  discussed	  in	  previous	  sections	  and	  are	  now	  purely	  
commercial	  professional	  leagues	  fueled	  by	  the	  demands	  of	  fans	  (Staurowski,	  577).	  
Second,	  the	  demand	  for	  men’s	  basketball	  and	  football	  is	  far	  greater	  than	  the	  demand	  
for	  men’s	  track	  and	  field,	  men’s	  baseball,	  or	  men’s	  lacrosse,	  much	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  
it	  is	  far	  greater	  than	  women’s	  sports,	  which	  indicates	  that	  the	  disparity	  is	  a	  result	  of	  
discrimination	  that	  comes	  from	  sport,	  not	  from	  gender	  differences.	  Furthermore,	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the	  discrimination	  comes	  from	  the	  fans	  of	  the	  sport	  and	  not	  from	  the	  educational	  
institutions	  or	  the	  NCAA,	  proving	  that	  Title	  IX	  has	  little	  control	  over	  this	  issue.	  	  
The	  way	  in	  which	  athletic	  scholarships	  are	  distributed	  to	  male	  athletes	  in	  
college	  indicates	  that	  their	  purpose	  is	  not	  educational	  in	  nature.	  Instead,	  they	  
recognize	  an	  athlete’s	  capacity	  to	  produce	  on	  the	  athletic	  field,	  court,	  or	  arena	  and	  
only	  serve	  to	  meet	  whatever	  minimum	  threshold	  for	  academic	  participation	  is	  
necessary	  at	  each	  institution.	  These	  scholarships,	  along	  with	  the	  term	  “student-­‐
athlete”	  are	  also	  part	  of	  the	  NCAA’s	  toolkit	  to	  prevent	  athletes	  from	  holding	  worker	  
status	  (Staurowski,	  590).	  The	  revenue	  from	  men’s	  sports	  primarily	  funds	  the	  
equivalent	  scholarships	  for	  women,	  which	  do	  not	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  attracting	  
athletes	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  bring	  more	  fan	  and	  sponsor	  revenue.	  The	  only	  possible	  
exception	  to	  this	  is	  women’s	  basketball,	  which	  still	  does	  not	  produce	  enough	  
revenue	  to	  generate	  a	  profit	  for	  its	  athletic	  department.	  In	  this	  environment	  of	  
mass-­‐media	  commercialism,	  which	  is	  driven	  by	  revenue,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  a	  place	  for	  
the	  educational	  purposes	  of	  Title	  IX.	  
The	  best	  solution	  for	  reform	  is	  the	  A-­‐League.	  Under	  this	  model,	  which	  is	  
inspired	  by	  a	  proposition	  by	  Rick	  Talender	  of	  Sports	  Illustrated,	  those	  teams	  who	  are	  
currently	  members	  of	  Division	  1A	  along	  with	  any	  others	  interested	  in	  maintaining	  
big-­‐profile	  college	  sports	  would	  join	  this	  new	  league.	  Players	  in	  this	  league	  are	  
compensated	  under	  a	  free-­‐market	  system	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  described	  above,	  with	  
negotiable	  contracts	  similar	  to	  professional	  ones	  in	  the	  National	  Football	  League	  
(NFL)	  and	  the	  National	  Basketball	  League	  (NBA).	  They	  would	  not	  be	  required	  to	  be	  
enrolled	  as	  students	  at	  the	  university	  in	  question,	  but	  would	  receive	  one	  of	  year	  free	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tuition	  for	  each	  year	  they	  participate	  in	  the	  League	  in	  addition	  to	  their	  salary.	  This	  
tuition	  credit	  could	  be	  redeemable	  at	  any	  time,	  ensuring	  that	  these	  athletes	  could	  
focus	  on	  their	  sport	  fully	  without	  an	  academic	  load,	  as	  well	  as	  giving	  them	  the	  ability	  
to	  focus	  on	  their	  academic	  work	  exclusively	  after	  they	  retire	  from	  their	  sport.	  
Universities	  retain	  control	  over	  their	  teams,	  as	  they	  will	  continue	  to	  represent	  their	  
respective	  institutions.	  In	  addition,	  the	  institutions	  can	  sell	  shares	  of	  their	  teams	  to	  
investors,	  allowing	  higher	  revenue	  that	  can	  be	  used	  for	  various	  expenses	  of	  the	  
athletic	  department	  for	  both	  revenue-­‐generating	  and	  non-­‐revenue-­‐generating	  
sports.	  Universities	  that	  are	  mainly	  interested	  in	  education	  and	  are	  disinterested	  in	  
this	  model	  such	  as	  Division	  2	  and	  3	  institutions	  can	  remain	  separate	  and	  continue	  to	  
operate	  their	  college	  sports	  as	  they	  do	  today.	  The	  fans	  who	  clam	  strong	  allegiances	  
to	  current	  big-­‐time	  teams	  can	  continue	  to	  watch	  their	  favorite	  sports,	  enjoy	  the	  
same	  rivalries,	  and	  even	  participate	  in	  March	  Madness	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  The	  
effective	  change	  from	  an	  altered	  form	  of	  amateurism	  to	  professionalism	  due	  to	  a	  
court	  order	  explaining	  the	  unfair	  nature	  of	  the	  current	  situation	  is	  likely	  to	  persuade	  
avid	  fans	  to	  support	  the	  change	  toward	  a	  more	  fair	  system	  of	  compensation	  and	  in	  
unlikely	  to	  lead	  them	  to	  reject	  the	  A-­‐League	  and	  stop	  watching	  the	  sports	  to	  which	  
they	  are	  so	  dedicated	  today.	  	  
Many	  officials	  currently	  holding	  positions	  of	  power	  such	  as	  athletic	  director,	  
coach,	  or	  college	  president	  would	  undoubtedly	  oppose	  the	  A-­‐League	  because	  of	  loss	  
of	  jobs	  and	  authority.	  Furthermore,	  the	  NFL	  and	  NBA	  are	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  happy	  
about	  subsidizing	  this	  minor	  league	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  the	  talent	  they	  have	  
previously	  been	  reaping	  at	  no	  cost.	  While	  the	  NCAA	  would	  have	  to	  change	  its	  stance	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on	  amateurism,	  something	  they	  are	  not	  likely	  to	  enjoy	  being	  forced	  to	  do;	  their	  past	  
actions	  prove	  that	  they	  are	  not	  opposed	  to	  change	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  term.	  The	  
Association’s	  inclination,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  position	  of	  the	  regents	  of	  universities	  clearly	  
points	  toward	  maintaining	  the	  status	  quo	  of	  college	  sports,	  which	  places	  most	  of	  the	  
money	  in	  their	  pockets,	  meaning	  that	  they	  will	  automatically	  oppose	  policy	  change.	  
This	  is	  why	  a	  court	  order	  or	  a	  decision	  by	  the	  National	  Board	  of	  Labor	  Relations	  is	  
the	  only	  effective	  way	  to	  reform	  college	  sports.	  
Possible	  problems	  with	  the	  A-­‐League	  include	  the	  prospect	  of	  students	  who	  
sustain	  an	  injury	  early	  in	  their	  career	  and	  are	  unable	  to	  continue	  performing.	  Such	  
students	  would	  lose	  their	  salary	  and	  be	  forced	  to	  retire	  from	  the	  sport	  with	  only	  one	  
year	  of	  free	  tuition	  available	  to	  them.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  unlike	  the	  problems	  that	  
any	  given	  grant-­‐in-­‐aid	  scholar	  would	  have	  under	  the	  current	  system.	  He	  would	  be	  
forced	  to	  leave	  school	  if	  he	  could	  not	  afford	  the	  remaining	  tuition	  since	  all	  athletic	  
scholarships	  are	  only	  good	  for	  one	  year.	  Unfortunately,	  promising	  young	  prospects	  
that	  fail	  to	  perform	  and	  are	  dropped	  from	  the	  A-­‐League	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  
transfer	  to	  a	  member-­‐school	  of	  the	  amateur	  divisions	  because	  they	  would	  have	  
already	  been	  professionals.	  Although	  this	  would	  be	  a	  disadvantage	  to	  college	  
athletes,	  the	  spirit	  of	  amateurism	  would	  be	  better	  preserved,	  as	  these	  individuals	  
chose	  to	  focus	  on	  athletics	  over	  academics	  by	  joining	  the	  A-­‐League,	  possibly	  without	  
even	  matriculating.	  Their	  athletic	  careers	  would	  have	  come	  to	  an	  end	  regardless	  
since	  the	  NFL	  or	  the	  NBA	  would	  no	  longer	  consider	  them	  if	  they	  were	  deemed	  
inappropriate	  in	  the	  A-­‐League.	  But	  their	  involvement	  in	  amateur	  athletics	  could	  
continue	  at	  the	  intramural	  or	  club	  level	  at	  any	  university.	  The	  non-­‐revenue	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generating	  sports	  would	  suffer	  because	  of	  losing	  the	  minimal	  funding	  they	  used	  to	  
receive	  from	  football	  and	  basketball.	  However,	  if	  these	  sports	  are	  to	  remain	  part	  of	  
the	  educational	  mission	  of	  the	  school	  as	  prescribed	  by	  the	  NCAA,	  the	  student	  fees	  
and	  tuition,	  as	  well	  as	  ticket	  sales	  could	  be	  used	  to	  easily	  offset	  the	  cost	  of	  operating	  
these	  sports.	  Using	  this	  platform	  for	  reform,	  student-­‐athletes	  could	  bring	  forth	  a	  
successful	  petition	  to	  overturn	  the	  previous	  court	  decision	  in	  Banks	  using	  the	  rule-­‐
of-­‐reason	  test	  for	  the	  Sherman	  Anti-­‐trust	  Act	  and	  bring	  balance	  to	  college	  athletics.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	   The	  perverse	  actions	  of	  the	  NCAA	  have	  systematically	  served	  to	  maximize	  the	  
profits	  of	  its	  governing	  boards	  and	  the	  athletic	  departments	  of	  the	  universities.	  
Simultaneously,	  the	  ever-­‐growing	  level	  of	  competition	  and	  the	  massive	  
responsibilities	  that	  take	  precedence	  over	  and	  distract	  them	  from	  their	  academic	  
duties	  have	  dwarfed	  the	  benefits	  that	  athletes	  deride	  from	  this	  extra-­‐curricular	  
activity.	  Through	  its	  various	  legal	  maneuverings,	  the	  Association	  has	  acquired	  a	  
variety	  of	  imposing	  powers	  over	  its	  member	  institutions	  and	  athletes.	  Having	  been	  
allowed	  a	  dictatorial	  mandate,	  The	  NCAA’s	  president	  claimed	  “’amateurism’	  
describes	  the	  participants	  not	  the	  enterprise”	  (Brand,	  5).	  Its	  unreasonable	  bylaws	  
have	  stretched	  as	  far	  as	  being	  able	  to	  supersede	  the	  order	  of	  a	  court	  of	  law	  as	  it	  can	  
sanction	  schools	  for	  obeying	  a	  court	  order	  benefitting	  a	  college	  athlete	  if	  that	  order	  
were	  ever	  to	  be	  modified	  or	  removed	  (2012-­‐2013	  NCAA…,	  Bylaw	  19.7).	  They	  have	  
drawn	  a	  veil	  of	  amateurism	  before	  the	  American	  public	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  cover	  the	  
capitalist	  growth	  of	  commercialized	  college	  athletics.	  Unfortunately	  for	  them,	  it	  is	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becoming	  clear	  that	  their	  veil	  is	  shrinking	  and	  is	  no	  longer	  able	  to	  hide	  their	  growing	  
revenue.	  	  
Their	  staunch	  opposition	  to	  paying	  athletes	  exists	  only	  on	  paper	  as	  
exemplified	  their	  own	  bylaw:	  “a	  professional	  athlete	  is	  one	  who	  receives	  payment	  
for	  athletic	  participation	  except	  as	  permitted	  by	  the	  governing	  legislation	  of	  the	  
Association”(2012-­‐2013	  NCAA…,	  Bylaw	  12.02.3),	  indicating	  that	  they	  are	  only	  
opposed	  to	  paying	  athletes	  in	  a	  manner	  inconsistent	  with	  their	  own	  provisions.	  
Reform	  will	  not	  come	  from	  the	  group	  of	  greedy	  leaders	  at	  the	  top	  of	  athletic	  
departments	  and	  the	  NCAA,	  but	  from	  collective	  action	  from	  the	  wronged	  athletes	  
instead.	  Either	  through	  a	  careful	  presentation	  of	  their	  employment	  status	  under	  the	  
NLRA	  or	  an	  appeal	  to	  a	  federal	  court’s	  rule-­‐of-­‐reason	  test	  for	  the	  Sherman	  Anti-­‐
Trust	  Act,	  reform	  to	  Division	  1A	  is	  entirely	  possible	  through	  the	  alterative	  of	  the	  A-­‐
League.	  This	  minor	  league	  will	  divorce	  students	  from	  athletes,	  while	  better	  
preserving	  the	  academic	  goals	  of	  post-­‐secondary	  education	  and	  solving	  the	  issues	  of	  
hypocrisy	  within	  intercollegiate	  athletics.	  Despite	  inevitable	  opposition	  from	  the	  
leaders	  of	  the	  NCAA	  and	  college	  sports,	  the	  A-­‐League	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  better	  system	  
that	  separates	  amateurism	  from	  commercialism	  and	  promotes	  a	  healthy	  learning	  
environment.	  	  
The	  initial	  conceptions	  of	  amateurism	  can	  flourish	  today	  in	  a	  system	  that	  
ends	  the	  injustice	  brought	  to	  the	  young	  men	  who	  work	  long	  hours,	  putting	  their	  
body	  at	  risk	  of	  permanent	  injury	  for	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  a	  nation	  that	  is	  so	  impressed	  
by	  their	  talent	  that	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  spend	  their	  hard-­‐earned	  money	  to	  see	  them	  
perform.	  The	  American	  free-­‐market	  system	  demands	  compensation	  for	  all	  labor	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that	  produces	  value	  to	  the	  consumer.	  Established	  laws	  against	  monopsony	  and	  
cartel	  behavior	  exist	  to	  protect	  the	  American	  consumers	  and	  workers	  in	  every	  
commercial	  enterprise	  other	  than	  the	  one	  in	  which	  we	  entrust	  our	  youngest	  and	  
most	  promising	  athletes	  as	  they	  leave	  the	  comfort	  and	  security	  of	  their	  home.	  Our	  
economic	  system	  is	  governed	  by	  such	  principles	  as	  these	  through	  our	  laws	  in	  order	  
to	  ensure	  that	  the	  persons	  that	  fuel	  the	  machine	  are	  not	  forgotten	  in	  the	  haze	  of	  
profit.	  This	  is	  simply	  what	  is	  just	  under	  our	  political	  and	  economic	  definition.	  Justice	  
in	  the	  intercollegiate	  athletics	  arena	  is	  long	  overdue.	  It	  is	  time	  for	  the	  victims	  of	  the	  
hypocritical	  system	  set	  up	  by	  the	  NCAA	  to	  take	  their	  grievances	  to	  a	  higher	  court	  
and	  demand	  the	  minimum	  fruit	  for	  their	  toil,	  a	  just	  salary.	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